Some Squadrons had to be Replaced after a Week

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Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding was a big advocate of squadron rotation to give respite and time for training. The Luftwaffe on the other hand kept their units continuously in the front line.

Even as far back as July 1915 after the Battle of the Somme, Dowding was a strong supporter of pilot rotation.  When Dowding was commanding officer of No 16 Squadron, he clashed with General Trenchard, commander of the RFC, over the need to rest pilots exhausted by non-stop duty.


Here's how squadron rotation worked during the Battle of Britain, in Dowding's own words:

A fresh squadron coming into an active Sector would generally bring with them sixteen aircraft and about twenty trained pilots. They would normally fight until they were no longer capable of putting more than nine aircraft into the air, and then they had to be relieved.

This process occupied different periods according to the luck and skill of the unit. The normal period was a month to six weeks, but some units had to be replaced after a week or ten days.

By the beginning of September, the incidence of casualties became so serious that a fresh squadron would become depleted and exhausted before any of the resting and reforming squadrons was ready to take its place.

Fighter pilots still could not be turned out by the training units in numbers sufficient to fill the widening gaps in the fighting ranks. Transfers were made from the Fleet Air Arm and from the Bomber and Coastal Commands, but these pilots naturally required a short flying course on Hurricanes and Spitfires and some instruction in formation flying, fighter tactics and interception procedure.

by Steve Dunster

Hugh Dowding, architect of the Battle of Britain

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Hugh Dowding won us the Battle of Britain 

Was he rewarded? 

No! He was sacked!

The Battle of Britain was never part of Germany's war plan. If it had of been they would have built a strategic bomber force but their intent was to subdue the UK into taking no part in hostilities.

Hitler had assured Goering in 1938 that "War with England was quite out of the question". Even as late as August 1940 Hitler was hoping that the UK would sue for peace and forbad terror bombing of English cities.

The Battle of Britain was not even in the fore-minds of many of those at the Air Ministry or high up in the Royal Air Force. In 1932 British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin declared that "The bomber will always get through" and many people in positions of authority agreed with him.

There was a popular view that there was little point having a fighter defence system and that the only way to win an air war was to have sufficient bombers at your disposal so as to be able to deliver a "knock-out" blow to the enemy in response.

Dowding disagreed with Baldwin and all his supporters. He could foresee an air war that Baldwin thought would never happen but an air war that we now call the Battle of Britain.

Dowding was right. He confronted the political heavy-weights who advocated "the bomber will always get through" and won, but not without making political enemies.

The "Dowding System"

In July 1936 Dowding was appointed commanding officer of the newly created RAF Fighter Command. The integrated air defence system he put together had the following elements:

1. Radar (Dowding was one of the first to see its potential)
2. Royal Observer Corps (who filled in the gaps of radar coverage)
3. Raid Plotting
4. Radio control of aircraft

He ensured that the network was linked by dedicated telephone cables buried sufficiently deeply to provide protection against bombing. The network had its centre at a converted country house on the outskirts of London, RAF Bentley Priory.

The system as a whole later became known as Ground Control Interception (GCI) but is still referred to as the "Dowding System."

Introduction of New Aircraft

Dowding introduced modern aircraft into the service including the Spitfire and Hurricane. He was not a supporter of the Defiant, instead he felt that the best fighters were those that were forward firing and aimed by the pilot.

He is credited with having taken on the Air Ministry and won to ensure that fighter aircraft were equipped with bullet proof wind shields.

Battle of Britain

Dowding resisted repeated requests from Prime Minister Winston Churchill to weaken the home defence by sending precious squadrons to France before it fell.

Yet again, Dowding had determined a carefully thought through path and faced-down political heavy-weights, but with political cost.

During the Battle itself the Dowding System worked as a force-multiplier, getting much greater benefit from the small forces at his disposal.

Dowding's major contribution during the Battle was to marshal resources behind the scenes including replacement aircraft and air crew. He left his subordinate commanders more or less a free hand to run the battle in detail.

Dowding's Downfall after Victory

Dowding had foreseen the Battle of Britain, prepared for it, fought it and won it. At each of these stages he had carefully considered his options, chosen what turned out to be correct choices but in the process he made resentful political enemies.

"The bomber will always get through" supporters thought money should be spent on building a stronger bomber force not wasted on his Fighter Command approach.

During the Battle of Britain it became clear to all that Bomber Command was nowhere near strong enough to be capable of delivering the "knock-out blow" required to deter Germany from bombing England. As Dowding's Fighter Command approach was seen to be succeeding, resentment against him grew.

Dowding's strategy of preserving his fighter reserve by using guerrilla tactics against large bomber formations as directed by his ground controllers proved highly successful. At the height of the Battle his approach was challenged strongly by 12 Group commander Leigh-Mallory and Acting Squadron Leader Douglas Bader. They strongly advocated the unwieldy and ineffective Big Wing approach of forming up three or more squadrons before engaging the enemy. As Keith Park pointed out, Big Wings were too slow to form up and usually in the wrong place.

History gives us the hindsight of knowing that Dowding's choices were correct but political momentum seemed again to have been with his adversaries.

As the RAF began to win the air war over England it was inevitable that the daylight skies would be cleared and German bombers would restrict their operations to night bombing. Dowding knew this would happen and also knew that the only answer to this lay in the development of Airborne Interception Radar. His efforts to bring AI radar into service had been frustrated by those around him but when the night Blitz of London started and AI radar wasn't ready, political pressure was applied to him.

A committee of enquiry chaired by Sir John Salmond produced a long list of recommendations to improve night air defence. Dowding approved only a selection of Salmond's recommendations. Churchill and Lord Beaverbrook decided it was time for Dowding to step down.

Personally I don't know what the recommendations were but it seems entirely in Dowding's character to have carefully considered all the options and only backed those he thought of value...and he may have been right...but those panicked by the politics caused by the dreadful bombings would have wanted to have seen every possible action taken.

Dowding was unwillingly replaced in command in November 1940 by Big Wing advocate Sholto Douglas.

If you want to know more about how Dowding and his 11 Group commander Keith Park suffered politically after their victory of the Battle of Britain, you may like to read our blog about it: 
Big Wing or Political Conspiracy

The Gratitude of Every Home in Our Island?

It seems sad that it was Churchill's words about the gratitude of the whole nation going out to those who'd eventually win us that Battle of Britain, and that it was Churchill who sided with Dowding's political adversaries in his sacking.

The lack of gratitude felt by Dowding when he was sacked by Churchill after he won the Battle of Britain must have been remarkably similar to that that Churchill wrote about after losing the 1945 General Election having won the War.

In the Words of His Pilots

Squadron Leader George Darley

Dowding was too nice a chap and he came up against a gang of thugs. Leigh-Mallory was very jealous of him. He felt he wasn't getting enough of the limelight and he got a lot of backing in the Air Ministry.

Flight Lieutenant Francis Wilkinson

It was entirely [Dowding's] foresight in being able to see where the strain was going to come, and to be able to take the measure of that strain, which allowed Fighter Command to bear the enormous, almost unbearable load that it had when the fighting came. Stuffy (the pilot's nickname for Dowding) had foreseen that our fighter squadrons were going to be depleted in strength. He had foreseen that Sector Operations Room would be bombed. And he'd made plans for the rapid interchange of squadrons between Scotland and Northern England and the South. If it hadn't been for his colossal foresight and meticulous planning right from the very beginning, we'd have had it.

Squadron Leader Sandy Johnstone

After Stuffy was made to retire the war blew up into a global thing. Great names arose - Eisenhower, Montgomery, Alexander, Bradley. Great battles were won - Alamein, D-Day, the crossing of the Rhine. But they were all courtesy of Stuffy Dowding. None of these people would even have been heard of if Stuffy hadn't been there, if he hadn't won the Battle of Britain. His statue ought to be standing atop a plinth in Trafalgar Square.


My Personal Opinion

Dowding was known for his humility and great sincerity and was widely considered by his pilots as a leader who cared for his men and had their best interests at heart.

He often referred to his "dear fighter boys" as his "chicks", in fact his son Derek was one of them.

Dowding seems to have been a thoughtful and clever man. A man who felt that the burden of command was to determine the best answer and fight for its implementation whatever the political cost.

All politics can do is get you sacked...but being wrong can get people killed!

Luckily for us he achieved great things, 
things that we could easily look back on and say that "This was our Finest Hour"

...sadly he suffered terribly at "man's ingratitude".

The inscription at the foot of Dowding's statue outside St Clement Danes church on the Strand in London, is one of the finest tributes to him I have read and I share it with you:

Air Chief Marshal Lord Dowding was commander-in-chief of Fighter Command, Royal Air Force, from its formation in 1936 until November 1940. 

He was thus responsible for the preparation for and the conduct of the Battle of Britain. With remarkable foresight, he ensured the equipment of his command with monoplane fighters, the Hurricane and the Spitfire. 

He was among the first to appreciate the vital importance of R.D.F. (radar) and an effective command and control system for his squadrons. 

They were ready when war came. 

In the preliminary stages of that war, he thoroughly trained his minimal forces and conserved them against strong political pressure to disperse and misuse them. 

His wise and prudent judgement and leadership helped to ensure victory against overwhelming odds and thus prevented the loss of the Battle of Britain and probably the whole war. 

To him, the people of Britain and of the Free World owe largely the way of life and the liberties they enjoy today

If you want to know more about how Dowding and his 11 Group commander Keith Park suffered politically after their victory of the Battle of Britain, you may like to read our blog about it:
Big Wing or Political Conspiracy

by Steve Dunster

The Destruction of Fighter Command - in 4 Days?

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Hitler's Directive for the Conduct of War Against England

On 1 August 1940 Hitler issued his Directive No 17, For the Conduct of Air and Naval Warfare Against England. In summary it said:

• Employ all forces available to eliminate the British air force as soon as possible
• Once temporary or local air superiority is achieved, operations will continue against ports
• Air operations against hostile naval and merchant ships will be considered a secondary mission
• The intensified air offensive will be conducted so that adequately strong air forces can be made available whenever required to support naval operations against favourable fleeting targets

Eagle Attack

On 2 August 1940 the Luftwaffe General Staff issued the plan for the destruction of the RAF, starting the campaign for the Battle of Britain. Their plan for Adlerangrif or "Eagle Attack" consisted of three phases:

Phase One

First 5 days: attacks made a semicircle starting in the west and proceeding south and then east, within a 90 to 60 mile radius of London

Phase Two

Next 3 days: radius from London reduced to between 60 and 30 miles

Phase Three

Final 5 days: attacks concentrated within a 30 mile radius centred on London


In addition to the task of defeating the RAF, the German Combined Staffs had issued a directive in July from Field Marshal Keitel stipulating:

"The German lack of command of the sea could be substituted by supremacy in the air"

It was recognised that permanent air supremacy was impossible without the occupation by land forces because many of the British air bases and supporting factories were beyond the range that Luftwaffe bombers could operate with fighter escorts. But it was thought that temporary air supremacy over the invasion area would be possible. This was considered sufficient to allow Operation Sea Lion (the invasion of England) to proceed as planned.

The Luftwaffe were confident in their believe that they could achieve:

"The destruction of RAF Fighter Command in the south, would take four days"

Not all of the Luftwaffe leadership was the General Staff that Alderangrif was the correct approach. The two Luftlotten commanders, Sperrle and Kesselring, both felt that RAF Fighter Command should be decisively weakened through night attacks before beginning any significant daylight operations.

These views were over-ruled by Goering who believed that Fighter Command had already been substantially weakened. Goering was slowly beginning to take more and more control of Luftwaffe operations.

PHASE ONE of Eagle Attack

On 6 August 1940 Goering set 10 August as the start date for Eagle Attack but bad weather postponed it until 13 August. On the 13th marginal weather resulted in the cancellation of some missions and sporadic  results from others. Instead of focussing on Fighter Command, target types were many and varied, including: Bomber Command airfields, Fighter Command airfields, Coastal Command stations, channel shipping, aircraft factories and at least nine manufacturing cities.

There was little other objective other than to "test the British defences."

Throughout Phase One, through to the 18 August, attacks were directed against Fighter Command but generally only limited damage was inflicted with most facilities back in service within hours.

Despite having the objective to reduce the effectiveness of Fighter Command, only limited effort was directed against Fighter Command bases, facilities and command and control capabilities.

Goering's Reorganisation after Phase One

The Luftwaffe believed it was sufficient to draw up the British fighters to kill them in the air and a German intelligence report on the 18 August suggested that it was working:

"Estimated that the British had lost 770 fighters in the period from 1st July to 16th August and that only 300 were still operational"

In reality 214 British fighters had been destroyed, 71 damaged in combat and more than 600 were still operational.

At the end of Phase One, Goering decided to withdraw Ju87s from the Battle because of their excessive losses and he needed to conserve them for support of invasion forces. Bf110s had suffered similarly high losses but Goering refused to withdraw them, instead he directed Bf109s to escort them as well as bombers.

Despite the Bf109s accounting for the majority of RAF kills, Goering would persistently blame the Bf109 pilots for lack of aggression and this led to some senior fighter unit commanders being replaced.

Goering also decided there was little value to making any further attacks of British radar installations.

PHASE TWO of Eagle Attack

Phase Two did not immediately follow the first phase because of reorganisation or additional fighter forces in the Pas de Calais and because of bad weather. After a five day delay the offensive resumed on 24 August. The Luftwaffe concentrated its attacks on Manston, Hornchurch and North Weald.

New tactics were used by both sides. The Luftwaffe used fewer bombers and more fighters in their formations because of the continued reluctance of the British to do battle with the German fighters. Park had ordered his pilots to accept combat with German fighters only if Fighter Command sector airfields were threatened.

For the duration of Phase Two, 24 August to 6 September, the RAF lost 273 fighters in combat plus 49 damaged. The Luftwaffe lost 308 fighters and bombers with 62 damaged.

Six out of seven sector airfields were extensively damaged and the telecommunications links to and from the operations blocks had proved especially vulnerable.

The German strategy of concentrating on attacking Fighter Command airfields was working, it was forcing the RAF fighters into combat. The higher concentration of fighters in German raids reduced the edge that Fighter Command had previously had.

The Luftwaffe could afford to trade Bf109s one for one with Spitfires and Hurricanes.

Fighter Command was Facing Destruction by the end of Phase Two

According to Dowding, "The rate of loss was so heavy that fresh squadrons became worn out before convalescing squadrons were ready to take their place."

Dwindling Reserves

Between 8 August and 6 September, 657 British fighters had been lost. By using replacement aircraft from repairs and storage, Fighter Command had managed to keep frontline strength to about the same levels as were available at the end of July - until 1 September.

Reserves had dwindled from 518 Spitfires and Hurricanes on 6 July to only 292 by 7 September.

Disappointing Production

In the last week of August, only 91 Spitfires and Hurricanes were produced while losses reached 137 destroyed and 11 seriously damaged.

On the Verge of Destruction

Fighter Command estimated that reserves would be exhausted in three weeks followed by the steady depletion of frontline squadrons. This would be accelerated if the Luftwaffe could successfully know out critical production facilities.

Critical Shortage of Pilots

In Phase One of the campaign (8 to 18 August) the RAF lost 154 pilots (killed, seriously wounded or missing) but only 63 new fighter pilots had come through from the training schools.

During August the combat strength of Fighter Command fell by almost a third from 1,434 to 1,023. The squadron average fell from 26 to 16 operational pilots.

In July and August, roughly a quarter of the squadron leaders and a third of the flight leaders had been killed or removed from flying due to injuries.

Experienced pilots made up less than half of Fighter Command's strength, the remainder having less than 20 hours flying time on fighters.

Stress levels were high and it was not uncommon for pilots to fly three or four sorties a day.

Eagle Attack Nearly Worked

The RAF was faced with the real possibility of withdrawing the depleted and exhausted 11 Group to bases north of London.

Goering's Eagle Attack was close to success. The Luftwaffe had within its grasp the possibility of achieving air superiority over the landing grounds of Operation Sea Lion, the German invasion of England.

Luftwaffe's Change in Strategy

From the Luftwaffe's point of view, losses were very heavy and they had failed to tempt the RAF up in sufficient numbers to allow the German fighters to deliver the decisive blow.

The idea of attacking London was gaining traction by the end of August.

The German High Command had set 15 September as the original date for the invasion but by the beginning of September it was delayed until 21 September because the Luftwaffe had not neutralised the threat from the British Navy and RAF to the invasion forces.

On 3 September Goering told Kesselring and Sperrle that there was no chance of destroying the English fighters on the ground and the RAF's last reserves would have to be forced into the air.

His idea was that if the British were heavily defending their airfields, then they would defend even more vigorously their capital. Since London was within the range of the Bf109, the Luftwaffe could more easily concentrate their fighter forces for the kill.

Sperrle strongly disagreed with Goering's plan to attack London. He felt that the British forces were too strong and that they too could concentrate all the their fighters over London. He favoured continued attacks on the airfields.

German intelligence reports suggested that British aircraft serviceability was as low as 100 at the end of August. In fact the operational strength stood at 672 on 23 August.

Hitler had forbidden attacks on London but the British had launched several attacks on Berlin in response to an accidental bombing of parts of London on 24 August. Fearing for his own popularity, Hitler agreed on 31 August to reprisal attacks on London.

PHASE THREE of Eagle Attack

On 7 September, Phase Three started with 650 bombers and over 1,000 attacking London docks by day. Substantial damage was inflicted on London but Fighter Command, from 7 September onwards, had been saved from defeat on the ground. However, it was still possible that the RAF could be defeated in the air above London.

From 11 to 14 September, London was attack by two major attacks (200+ bombers) and two minor attacks by day as well as attacks every night. Additional day raids were also carried out on Southampton (twice), Portland, Brighton, Eastbourne, Canterbury, Great Yarmouth and Norwich presumably to soften up the defences of these cities in preparation for invasion. But instead, the Luftwaffe would almost certainly have been better targeting 11 Group airfields.

Luftwaffe bombers losses were high and the bomber commanders were successful in getting Goering to order that the first role of the German fighters was to protect the bombers and not attack the enemy, but his stated objective was to draw up fighters so they could be destroyed. The whole purpose of attacking London in the first place would seem to have been lost.

The respite experienced by RAF airfields allowed the first break in over ten days for the pilots of 11 Group. Fighter Command had been in a state of near exhaustion but a new vigour resulted and was to prove decisive in the air battles on 15 September, they day that is now celebrated as Battle of Britain Day.

The Decisive Day - 15 September 1940

The Luftwaffe High Command fully expected the missions scheduled for 15 September to be the decisive blow. From Hitler down, the German leadership believed that Fighter Command had been broken in spirit and material. RAF resistance to attacks on 11 and 14 September had been slight (owing to errors in coordinating intercepts).

Attacks against London on 15 September involved 300 bombers and 1,000 fighters with another raid  of 30 against Portland and Southampton aircraft works.

With the support of 12 Group, Fighter Command met the raid with 170 Spitfires and Hurricanes operating from bases close to London which were not under attack.

Fighter Command downed 58 and damaged 25 German aircraft including 26 fighters lost and 8 damaged. Psychologically, the blow to the Luftwaffe was devastating.

British superiority on the 15 September was most likely to have benefited from the proximity of their airfields to the Battle, the freshness of the crews, the fact the airfields had not been attacked for the two days previous and the fact there was no diversionary raid.

German attacks continue in attempts to wear down the enemy but none with the strength launched on the 15 September.

Despite their continuing attacks, the Luftwaffe saw no evidence that the RAF was getting weaker but was suffering terrible losses.

Eventually raids would be restricted to the hours of darkness and Operation Sea Lion was indefinitely postponed. In the Spring of 1941, Hitler turned his attentions towards Russia and the Luftwaffe units that had been bombing England were re-deployed to the Eastern Front.

Britain can be grateful to more than just Churchill's Few

Fighter Command, particularly Dowding and Park but also all the pilots and ground crew, had played their part well and were well deserved recipients of the "gratitude of every home in our Island."

But Britain should also be grateful to some of those "in the abodes of the guilty" (as Churchill described the Germans):

had they attacked airfields by night prior to attacking them by day, 

had they attacked the airfields for longer, 

had they continued to attack Britain's radar installations, 

had Goering allowed his fighters to engage the British fighters instead of protecting his bombers, 

had Goering continued to attack airfields whilst he attacked London

had Hitler followed his instinct and prevented attacks on London 

and focussed on air-supremacy over his landing grounds

then the Luftwaffe may have won the Battle of Britain and Hitler may have invaded England.

by Steve Dunster

British Radar: It's not what you've got - it's what you do with it!

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British radar has widely been credited as being a major reason for the RAF being able prevent the Luftwaffe from gaining air superiority over the UK during the Battle of Britain.

British radar could determine the distance and height of aircraft approaching the coast from 200 miles away and could even detect low flying aircraft from a distance of 100 miles away.

This allowed RAF Controllers to have sufficient early warning to be able to scramble fighters and direct (vector) them to intercept raids without having to fly standing patrols, giving exhausted pilots much needed respite at the height of the battle.

It is thought that the effectiveness of British radar largely neutralised the advantage that Germany should of had from its superiority in numbers making the Battle much more closely matched. Without radar the RAF would probably have been overwhelmed by the Luftwaffe and the Battle of Britain may well have been lost. 

Why didn't the Luftwaffe knock out the British radar stations? 

It wasn't because radar was a military secret or because Germany couldn't work out what the strange masts were for. They knew exactly what they were and what they were capable of.

Germany actually had much better radar than Britain during the Battle of Britain. Their radar sets were smaller; easier to rotate, move and position; higher resolution and able to detect smaller targets.

Whilst their Freya radar sets were better, they were of a more complex design and they only had 8 operational by the start of the war, leaving large gaps between covered areas.

British radar was simpler and easier to make and by the start of the war there was a complete chain of radar stations looking out to sea all along the southern and eastern coasts (Chain Home or CH).

Germany was successfully detecting RAF bomber raids in great detail with their radar but they were having big problems communicating any useful information in time to their intercepting fighters. They therefore assumed that the RAF would have the same problem so didn't see British radar as a high priority target.

Curiously, whilst Germany was having problems getting radar data to fighters, they did seem to have some success in vectoring bombers onto shipping targets they'd detecting some 60 miles away.

At the start of the Battle of Britain, Germany did try to attack British radar using two different methods: dive-bombing and jamming.

Dive-bombing met with little success, primarily because the huge masts of open steel construction were quite resilient to bomb damage. A few of the radar stations were taken off line temporarily but only for few hours. It is perhaps worth considering what might have happened if Germany had realised their importance and been more persistent in their raids.

Jamming only met with temporary success. In July 1940 a simple method of jamming was used by Germany but was easily defeated. In September 1940 a more elaborate method of jamming was used but this too was quickly defeated.

The Dowding System

What was exceptional about the British radar, was not the radar itself but the command and control method developed before the war by Dowding and his commanders.

British radar could only look out to sea, once the raid was over land, the radar was no help and plotting raids over land had to be done with the help of the Observer Corps.

The UK was divided up into small areas, each with it's own designation and there would be an Observer Corps detachment responsible for each. Each detachment would be connected by telephone to the same filter rooms as the radar stations allowing a battle plan be updated,almost in real time so the commanders could decide how to respond.

The UK had solved the problem of getting useful radar data to the intercepting fighters!

It also had radar stations that were resilient to bombing, a design that was simple and quick to construct, a radar coverage that was complete with no holes, a backup system with the Observer Corps and a radar design that was capable of being quickly modified to counter jamming.

Britain didn't have the best radar - but it did know what to do with it!

by Steve Dunster

Big Wing or Political Conspiracy?

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The term "Big Wing" refers to the aerial combat tactic of having several squadrons in a single formation and was contraversially adopted during the Battle of Britain by 12 Group commander Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory and Acting Squadron Leader Douglas Bader.

Initially the Duxford Wing (as it became known) had comprised 242, 310 and 19 Squadrons but later 302 and 611 Squadrons were also added.

It was thought larger formations (Big Wings) would facilitate the shooting down of higher numbers of enemy aircraft and incur fewer losses than using smaller formations. Sadly large formations were slow to deploy, difficult to manage in the air and chaotic in battle.

Leigh-Mallory and Bader of 12 Group felt there were huge advantages in having large formations to attack the enemy.

Dowding (commanding officer of Fighter Command) and Park (commander of 11 Group) strongly felt the opposite. Park had tried using Wings in the defence of the Dunkirk beaches and found them to be unwieldy, chaotic and often in the wrong place.

History has sided strongly with Dowding and Park

The Park approach of sending up single squadrons one after another to harass enemy formations on the way to their target was highly successful at protecting targets from the worst excesses of the raid and in the shooting down of enemy aircraft. Sadly it was costly and the tactic was not popular with some of his pilots because of the large losses.

This guerrilla approach to aerial combat was exactly right for the war Park had to fight but it made huge demands on the pilots' bravery and skill...nevertheless it protected targets and shot down enemy aircraft.

The Big Wing by comparison rarely engaged with the enemy (prior to the Luftwaffe raids on London) because it took too long to form up, was often in the wrong place, was unwieldy if it did engage and the increased chaos during combat resulted in much over-claiming of their successes. The Big Wing's actual successes turned out to be a fraction of what was claimed.

The supporters of the Big Wing would point out its high claims and low losses. Even at the time, the claims were thought to have been exaggerated and their low loss rate was accountable to the fact they had rarely engaged with the enemy.

So the Big Wing was an utter failure? Perhaps not...

History's assessment of the Big Wing's performance has been to assume its somewhat haphazard formation was solely intended to destroy enemy aircraft and protect intended targets...a purpose it was patently unsuited for according to the historic record.

But perhaps its purpose was not just to attack the Luftwaffe...it would seem that the Big Wing was an effective political device for use against Dowding.

Hugh Trenchard (founder of the RAF) had apparently clashed with Dowding when they were both commanders in the Royal Flying Corps during WW1.

Trenchard had retired by the time WW2 had started but was still influential at the highest levels of the RAF and Air Ministry.

Trenchard and his supporters felt that "the bomber would always get through" and that the only effective means of defending against bombing raids was to deliver a "knock out blow" by sending our own bombers back in response.

There was a strong feeling by some that Fighter Command was the wrong approach when it came to defence against bombers. Fortunately, Dowding managed to get enough political support to put together Fighter Command and its Dowding System of Command and Control...but Dowding was unpopular in powerful places.

When it became clear that Bomber Command was incapable of delivering a "knock out blow" to Germany in 1940 the pro-bomber advocates were severely embarrassed by Fighter Command's successes.

Was the Big Wing fiasco used by Dowding's political enemies to help bring him down?

The Duxford Big Wing was formed after only a telephone discussion between Leigh-Mallory and Bader with little planning and with no discussion or agreement with Fighter Command. Bader had great enthusiasm for a Big Wing and Leigh-Mallory took him at his word.

Is it dubious, or reckless, or negligent that a senior commander should take the word of an inexperienced junior officer and unilaterally commit to such a poorly executed experiment at such a critical time? And why did he put one of his least experienced Squadron Leaders in charge of such a difficult-to-lead unit?

Bader did not always follow ground control instructions and often flew into 11 Group's area on his own initiative leaving Fighter Command unable to use the Big Wing in any coordinated way and many times it was caught out of position and unable to do good.

Ironically Leigh-Mallory complained to Park during the Battle (according to McInstry), "Full explanation required why 11 Group fighters have shot down enemy fighters over 12 Group area."

At a meeting of the Air Council on 17 October 1940, Dowding and Park found themselves on the defensive. Park started to monitor the effectiveness of Leigh-Mallory's big wings and submitted a report which showed that in ten separate sorties in the second half of October they had managed to shoot down just one German aircraft. But nobody was interested. It would seem that political interests, not military evidence, was guiding those at the highest levels.

Despite having won the Battle of Britain, Dowding retired from his post in November 1940 and Keith Park was removed as commander of 11 Group and sent to Training Command. Park was replaced by Leigh-Mallory who brought his Big Wing ideas south. Leigh-Mallory would seem to have had sympathies in high places for his opinions and actions.

Dowding's career was over but Park would eventually be given commands as befitting his talents: Malta, Sicily and North Africa.

The Big Wing may not have played an important tactical role in Battle of Britain
...but it played a crucial role in the outcome of the political conspiracy against Dowding

When the Air Ministry's Historical Branch first published its account of the Battle of Britain, there was no mention of Hugh Dowding or Keith Park. It was only at Churchill's insistence that they were eventually included.

In a letter Park wrote at the time (McInstry), "Frankly I was more worried about the lack of cooperation (with Leigh-Mallory) than I was about out-witting the massed German raids."

Once Leigh-Mallory was in post at 11 Group in January 1941, a paper exercise was carried out to explore the effectiveness of a Big Wing within 11 Group. The intention was to prove the superiority of large formations using the circumstances of an actual attack on Kenley, Biggin Hill and Hornchurch sectors on 6 September 1940.

Leigh-Mallory mis-managed the operation, permitting the raid to progress unhindered which resulted in Kenley and Biggin Hill aerodromes being "bombed" whilst their aircraft were still on the ground.

We should perhaps be grateful that Leigh-Mallory wasn't successful in becoming 11 Group commander any sooner, the Battle of Britain may well have had a different outcome

by Steve Dunster