Understanding Luftwaffe Unit Designations

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To the untrained eye, the composition of the Luftwaffe can seem complex and hard to grasp. With designations such as StabII/StG2 and 3/JG27, it's easy to get befuddled, but once you get into the logic behind these names, it's really not that confusing.

At the time of the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe was split into 7 Luftflotten (Air Fleets). Luftflotten were created according to a geographical area, and as new territories were invaded, new Luftflotten were created.

Although Luftflotten could be moved to a new area, whilst in one place that Luftflotte had absolute control over all aspects of aviation in the region, including ground operations.

Each Luftflotte was also allocated 25 Geschwader (Wings). Luftflotte 1 would have Wings 1-25, Luftflotte 2 would have 26-50 etc.

Each Lutflotte was then divided into one of more Fliegerkorps (Air Corps), depending on the size and manner of the operations being undertaken. At the time of the Battle of Britain, 13 Fliegerkorps were in operation.

Similar to Luftflotten, the Fliegerkorps had their own areas of operations, and were responsible for all operational matters such as maintenance, ordnance and deployment. However, they depended on the parent Luftflotte for administration and supply purposes.

Each Fliegerkorps consists of several Geschwader (Wings) along with Reconnaissance Gruppen (Groups).

Geschwader are specialised to a certain operational duty, be it a fighter wing or a bomber wing. The others include dive-bombers, night fighters, gliders, transport and ground attack wings.

The designations of the different Geschwader are as follows:

Fighter Wing --- Jagdgeschwader (JG)
Night Fighter Wing --- Nachtjagdgeschwader (NJG)
Heavy Fighter Wing --- Zerstörergeschwader (ZG)
Bomber Wing --- Kampfgeschwader (KG)
Dive-Bomber Wing --- Sturzkampfgeschwader (StG)
Fast Bomber Wing --- Schnellkampfgeschwader (SKG)
Transport Wing --- Transportgeschwader (TG)
Ground Attack Wing --- Schlactgeschwader (SchlG)
Glider Wing --- Luftlandgeschwader (LLG)
Advanced Training Wing --- Lehrgeschwader (LG)

As there were more than one of each type of Wing, an Arabic numeral would be placed after the abbreviation to distinguish between them. For example,  the 27th Jagdgeschwader would be written as JG27

Each different Geschwader is then divided into 3 Gruppen (Groups), although sometimes a 4th or even a 5th were added to bolster the strength of the Geschwader.

The Gruppen within each Geschwader were ordered consecutiveley with Roman numerals. Therefore, the 4th group of the 27th Jagdgeschwader would be written as IV/JG27.

Each Gruppen then contained 3 or 4 Staffeln (Squadrons). The Staffeln were numbered consecutively in Arabic numerals within their Geschwader, regardless of the Gruppe they belonged to. For example,  the Staffeln of Gruppe I would be numbered 1, 2 and 3, but the Staffeln of Gruppe II would be numbered 4, 5 and 6.

The designations of Staffeln were similar to that of the Gruppen, but with Arabic numerals instead of Roman ones. The 3rd Staffel of Gruppe II of Jagdgeschwader 27 would be written as 6/JG27. Note that it's a 6 instead of a 3, as it's a part of the 2nd Gruppe.

Sometimes, designations will be written like StabJG27, or StabIV/JG27. The 'Stab' means 'Staff', and shows that that flight consists of aircrew and aircraft from the HQ staff, normally involving the Group/Wing Leader.

Each Group and Wing contains a single Staff flight (StabSchwarm) consisting of 4 aircraft (including the Group/Wing Leader).

A single Staffel contains on average 12 planes, although this can vary from 5 or 6 up to 16, depending on losses and reinforcements.

In a Fighter Wing, each Staffel is divided into 3 Schwarms (Flights) of 4 aircraft each. A Fighter Schwarm was then divided into 2 Rotten (Singular - Rotte, literally meaning 'Gang') of 2 aircraft each. A Rotte was the basic fighting unit, consisting of a Leader and a Wingman.

In a Bomber Wing, however, the Staffel is divided into 2 Schwarms of 6 aircraft each. Each Schwarm was then split into 2 Ketten (Singular - Kette, meaning 'Chain') of 3 aircraft each. The Kette was the standard bomber formation, and consisted of the 3 planes forming a V-shaped formation.

Examples:

9/KG76 --- 9th Squadron of the 76th Bomber Wing

3/StG77 --- 3rd Squadron of the 77th Dive-Bomber Wing

III/JG53 --- 3rd Group of the 53rd Fighter Wing

StabIII/KG2 --- Staff Flight of the 3rd Group of the 2nd Bomber Wing

So, just to recap, on average there are 12 aircraft in a Staffel, 3-5 Staffeln in a Gruppe, 3-5 Gruppen in a Geschwader, 25 Geschwader in a Luftflotte (spread out between several Fliegerkorps), and 7 Luftflotten in the entire Luftwaffe.

I hope this helps

by Kit Dunster

What was the Battle of Britain? ...and who were The Few?

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The American journalist Ralph Ingersoll thought that:

The Battle of Britain was important in history as Waterloo or Gettysburg

What was the Battle of Britain?

...maybe the answer depends on who you ask!

Answer 1: No Idea!

According to the results of a survey carried out by the RAF Benevolent Fund for the 75th Anniversary of the Battle of Britain (published by The Telegraph on 10 July 2015), of 1,000 people asked:

40% of today's young people have no idea of what the Battle of Britain is

Only half of all adults knew that The Few is a reference to those who fought in the Battle of Britain

One in ten 18-24 year olds thought the Battle of Britain took place last year

The same number thought the Battle of Britain referred to a Viking attack

Answer 2: Spitfires and Dashing Pilots

Spitfires look fantastic nowadays, they must have looked even more so during the 1940s when the previous frontline fighters were bi-planes. Some of the pilots were young, rich, well educated, drove fast sports cars and looked very dashing.

At a time when public morale was everything and large numbers of RAF aircraft were flying over the Home Counties, it would have made great sense to have publicised these dashing pilots on posters and in films.

In actuality, pilots came from all backgrounds and all parts of the Empire and a great number of them were not even officers.

Whilst the Spitfire is still one of the prettiest aircraft ever made, there were actually more Hurricanes than Spitfires during the Battle of Britain and they shot down more enemy aircraft.


Answer 3: The Greatest Air Battle Ever Fought

Germany had some 2,500 aircraft ranged against the UK. The RAF had some 600+ fighters. There was no doubt that the people who witnessed the Battle of Britain must have been in awe of the numbers involved.

The noise, the destructive power, the sight of hundreds of aircraft, wave after wave...something that may never be seen again.

Answer 4: When Britain Fought Alone against the Might of an Undefeated Nazi Germany

As "under-dog" stories go, the Battle of Britain has surely got to be up there with the best. Germany was huge and its industrial might was immense. Then after the fall of France, Germany had most of Continental Europe under its command.

Since the fall of France, Germany could launch air attacks and an invasion from anywhere along the East Coast but also anywhere along our South Coast too.

The Luftwaffe had more aircraft than the RAF, it had more experience, better tactics and arguably better equipment.

Answer 5: When Britain Turned the Tide of the War Against Germany

When war was declared on 3 September 1939, fear and anxiety seared through every family in the Realm.

The hideous violence of the Great War (as it was known then, only later to be known as the First World War), the War to End All Wars, was still fresh in living memory.

So many families had lost fathers, brothers and sons - gassed, machine-gunned, blow apart or drowned. Many of those that survived had missing limbs and many more had psychological damage. Almost every family had been affected or knew one that was.

It is these memories and images that went through the minds of families when they heard Neville Chamberlain declare war on the radio 3 September 1939.

Terrible though the First World War was, the next war was feared to be even worse. Air warfare technology had transformed. Modern aircraft could go higher, faster, further and carry bomb loads of unspeakable destructive power.

There was a feeling that "the bomber would always get through" and that they would not just drop high explosives but incendiaries and, the most feared of all, gas!

The entire population was issued with gas masks. It was an offence to be in public without carrying your gas mask.

By July 1940, UK families had lost 100,000 of their fathers, brothers and sons in the fall of France. Another 200,000 had only just made it home by the skin of their teeth and with the determination of the Royal Navy and it's fleet of Little Ships. They had lost their children, sent to the countryside to avoid the horrors of aerial bombing. The sea shores were off limits and covered in minefields and barbed wire. Local recreation grounds were now the homes of barrage balloons, search lights and anti-aircraft guns. Long cherished gardens had been dug up to plant vegetables and bury bomb shelters. Almost everybody, it seemed, was wearing military uniform or had become part of the war effort in civilian life as air raid wardens, fire watchers, working on farms or in factories or in hospitals or raising money.

The whole of Continental Europe had fallen to Nazi Germany in weeks. Two of the greatest armies in the world (of France and Britain) had been brushed aside with heavy losses. German forces were only a few short miles across the Channel. To the entire world, it seemed that England was next.

Refugees from Belgium and Occupied Europe had made it across the Channel with horrific stories of torture and summary executions. There could be little doubt in the minds of the ordinary British public that if Germany succeeded in invading the UK that political elites, academics, engineers and anybody in a leadership position would be imprisoned, deported or executed.

Can it be any wonder that when the new Prime Minister Winston Churchill with his rousing speeches in June about never surrendering that it captured the hearts and minds of the entire population.

The Home Fleet of the Royal Navy were given the job of destroying any invasion fleet that headed for UK shores. The Royal Navy was a formidable fighting force and one that is widely thought to have been our saviour should Hitler have actually attempted an invasion... but they were far out to sea and away from the public gaze.

The Royal Air Force on the other hand were flying frequently over homes, factories and farms going out to meet the enemy. With the roar of their Merlin engines and disciplined formations they must have been an exciting and encouraging sight for the desperate eyes of a frightened public.

The public could see swirling vapour trails as "our boys" engaged the enemy. Sometimes they'd see enemy aircraft shot down or even crash-land close by. It was a visible and tangible sight that gave weight to Churchill's assertion that: "we will never surrender."

I don't think Churchill can have over-stated it when he said that:

"....the gratitude of every home in our Island...goes out to the airmen who...are turning the tide of the war."

The reality is that the British Army and Royal Navy were every bit as involved in the prevention of the much feared invasion as the Royal Air Force was...but the RAF were always present, above the homes of the anxious...and they were winning...despite being dreadfully out-numbered and suffering dreadful losses.

...and for that, every home in the Island I am sure would have been immeasurably grateful...I know I would have been.

Answer 6: The gratitude of so many...to so few

Only weeks before the Battle of Britain, an army of some 300,000 British troops had been defeated in France...yet over the Summer of 1940...when everybody feared imminent invasion...only 3,000 young pilots were visibly "turning the tide of the war".

Numerically the pilots of the RAF were 1% of the number of men in the British Expeditionary Force that were driven out of France.

In my mind I can see how strongly Churchill's words would have resonated in the hearts of a grateful and relieved public when he said:

"Never in the field of human conflict, was so much owed, by so many, to so few"

Answer 7: Their Finest Hour

And what of Churchill's impassioned hope that:

"If the British Empire [were] to last a thousand years, men would still say, this was their finest hour."

The Battle of Britain is just about still within living memory, it was only 75 years ago

...and apparently half the population of the country that were saved from tyranny...have already forgotten The Few that saved them.

If our country did last a thousand years, and if the Battle of Britain did turn out to indeed have been its "finest hour" 

how ungrateful would it have been to have forgotten it entirely

Please, don't let the importance of the Battle of Britain die. It's not taught in schools, there are precious few films, plays or games of it and major book stores allocate very little shelf space to it.

Raise the profile of the Battle of Britain in any way you can and show your gratitude to The Few

...and everybody else who fought and lived through this extraordinary part of our history.

Thank you

by Steve Dunster

Who Had The Best Guns?

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British .303" (7.7mm) Browning guns:

8 machine guns mounted in wings (outside the propeller disk)
20 rounds per second per gun (160 rounds per second overall)
11.3 gram bullets fired at 740 m/s (2,430 fps)
16 seconds worth of ammunition

Bf109s MG 17s (7.9mm) machine guns:

2 machine guns mounted in the engine cowling (synchronised to shoot through the propeller disk)
17 rounds per second per gun (slower because of sync with propeller)
Slightly more destructive than the .303s (bullet mass and muzzle velocity varied)
1 minutes worth of ammunition

Bf109E-4 20mm MG-FFM cannon:

2 mounted in wings
9 rounds per second per cannon (18 rounds per second overall)
92 gram explosive projectiles fired at 700 m/s
Less than 7 seconds worth of ammunition

Comparison

Spitfires and Hurricanes had 8x .303" Browning machine guns mounted in the wings where as the Bf109 had 2x machine guns mounted in the engine cowling shooting through the propeller disk.

The Bf109 machine guns could not fire as quickly as the Browning machine guns because they had to synchronise with the propeller.

The British fighters had to have their guns adjusted so they harmonised at a single point at a predetermined distance from the aircraft (360m at the start of the Battle and reduced to 225m due to battle experience). This meant they were only at their most destructive at this single distance. The Bf109 machine guns were effective over a much broader ranger because they were so close to the centre-line of the aircraft.

The Bf109 machine guns were slightly more destructive than the British Brownings but could carry nearly a minute's worth of ammunition rather than the 16 seconds carried by a Spitfire.

The Bf109E-4 cannon, with its explosive projectile, was much more destructive than the Brownings but had a much slower firing rate (9 rounds per second instead of the Brownings' 20 rounds per second) and only had 7 seconds worth of ammunition on board.

The Bf109E-4 cannon had a long flight time and curved trajectory (due to its low muzzle velocity) which made it difficult to hit targets at distance. It was quite a challenge for the German pilots because the flight times and trajectory curves of the cannon and machine guns were different requiring different mental calculations during combat.

How Did This Play Out In Combat?

It was much easier for a Spitfire or Hurricane to hit something with its eight fast firing Brownings than it was for a Bf109 with its slow, difficult to aim cannon with only 7 seconds of ammunition. 

but...

if a Bf109E-4 hit its target could cause an immense amount of damage.

Many a German aircraft would be riddled with .303 bullet holes but still return to base.

The RAF committed to fitting its Spitfires and Hurricanes with .303 machine guns well before WW2 when aircraft were slower and less well armoured. By the time of the Battle of Britain the RAF knew they needed much more powerful armaments. They tried to hurry in the fitting of 20mm Hispano cannons but they weren't reliable until after the Battle had ended.

So Which Guns Were Best?

Lesser pilots would find it easier to hit their target flying a British fighter than a Bf109

Better pilots would find it easier to bring down their target flying a Bf109

Whilst the guns would seem to have been better in the German aircraft, perhaps fortune favoured the British solution in a battle of attrition where, as time went on, experienced pilots were shot down and replaced with less experienced pilots.

by Steve Dunster

The New Tactics that Devastated Convoy CW.8 on 25 July 1940

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On 25 July 1940 the Luftwaffe took advantage of improved weather to attack a twenty-one ship convoy as it made its way through the Straits of Dover but they did so with devastatingly effective new tactics.

Of the 21 ships in the convoy only 10 reached their destination of Portland, 11 ships were sunk or seriously disabled during the attack. Two Royal Naval destroyers sent to help were also put out of action and had to be towed back to Dover.

This was the first time that Germany attacked a convoy from land, sea and air. They fired on the convoy with its big guns around Cap Gris Nez, they attacked it using high-speed German naval S-boats and bombed it from the air using wave after wave of Ju87 Stuka dive-bombers. The effect was devastating and the attack lasted from 11:30am to 7:30pm.

In the morning Convoy CW.8 (Convoy Westward) was attacked by a wave of Ju87s, 50 Bf109s, fast S-boats and was fired upon from the French shore.

The escorting Bf109s came in at sea level to be met by Spitfires of 65 Squadron (Hornchurch) while the Ju87s came out of the sky to dive bomb the convoy.

No 32 Squadron Hurricanes (Biggin Hill) and 615 Squadron Hurricanes (Kenley) came to assist the sea level dogfight with the fifty Bf109s.

No 54 Squadron Spitfires (Rochford) answered the call for assistance from the escorting naval vessels and engaged Bf109s that had arrived to assist the Ju87s. No 54 Squadron was to suffer badly but with one Spitfire to every five Bf109s it was a wonder that they only lost three aircraft.

Further waves of attacking aircraft continued through out the afternoon.

The Royal Naval destroyers Boreas and Brilliant were sent out from Dover to repulse the German motor torpedo boats attacking the convoy. Pursuing the S-boats away from the convoy and towards Calais, the destroyers were attacked themselves by German bombers.

Ju87s badly damaged Boreas with two hits on her bridge, 17 crew were killed and 5 died of their wounds.

Brilliant was also bombed, receiving two hits in the stern. Her tiller flat was flooded and boiler room fan support cracked but there were no casualties.

Both destroyers were towed back into Dover by tugs. Brilliant's repairs wouldn't be completed until September 1940 and Boreas wasn't repaired until January 1941.

25 July 1940 was undoubtedly a bad day for the RAF, the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy.

The losses were so great that it was decided to only move convoys through the English Channel after darkness and the Admiralty moved their RN ships out of Dover and put them in the relative safety of Portsmouth. Merchant ships would take on gunners in order to offer some defence and escorts would be provided in the future.

The day undoubtedly belonged to Germany and its effective new tactics but Britain was learning and adapting - a pattern that would repeat itself many times throughout the Summer.

by Steve Dunster

Big Wing or Political Conspiracy?

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The term "Big Wing" refers to the aerial combat tactic of having several squadrons in a single formation and was contraversially adopted during the Battle of Britain by 12 Group commander Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory and Acting Squadron Leader Douglas Bader.

Initially the Duxford Wing (as it became known) had comprised 242, 310 and 19 Squadrons but later 302 and 611 Squadrons were also added.

It was thought larger formations (Big Wings) would facilitate the shooting down of higher numbers of enemy aircraft and incur fewer losses than using smaller formations. Sadly large formations were slow to deploy, difficult to manage in the air and chaotic in battle.

Leigh-Mallory and Bader of 12 Group felt there were huge advantages in having large formations to attack the enemy.

Dowding (commanding officer of Fighter Command) and Park (commander of 11 Group) strongly felt the opposite. Park had tried using Wings in the defence of the Dunkirk beaches and found them to be unwieldy, chaotic and often in the wrong place.

History has sided strongly with Dowding and Park

The Park approach of sending up single squadrons one after another to harass enemy formations on the way to their target was highly successful at protecting targets from the worst excesses of the raid and in the shooting down of enemy aircraft. Sadly it was costly and the tactic was not popular with some of his pilots because of the large losses.

This guerrilla approach to aerial combat was exactly right for the war Park had to fight but it made huge demands on the pilots' bravery and skill...nevertheless it protected targets and shot down enemy aircraft.

The Big Wing by comparison rarely engaged with the enemy (prior to the Luftwaffe raids on London) because it took too long to form up, was often in the wrong place, was unwieldy if it did engage and the increased chaos during combat resulted in much over-claiming of their successes. The Big Wing's actual successes turned out to be a fraction of what was claimed.

The supporters of the Big Wing would point out its high claims and low losses. Even at the time, the claims were thought to have been exaggerated and their low loss rate was accountable to the fact they had rarely engaged with the enemy.

So the Big Wing was an utter failure? Perhaps not...

History's assessment of the Big Wing's performance has been to assume its somewhat haphazard formation was solely intended to destroy enemy aircraft and protect intended targets...a purpose it was patently unsuited for according to the historic record.

But perhaps its purpose was not just to attack the Luftwaffe...it would seem that the Big Wing was an effective political device for use against Dowding.

Hugh Trenchard (founder of the RAF) had apparently clashed with Dowding when they were both commanders in the Royal Flying Corps during WW1.

Trenchard had retired by the time WW2 had started but was still influential at the highest levels of the RAF and Air Ministry.

Trenchard and his supporters felt that "the bomber would always get through" and that the only effective means of defending against bombing raids was to deliver a "knock out blow" by sending our own bombers back in response.

There was a strong feeling by some that Fighter Command was the wrong approach when it came to defence against bombers. Fortunately, Dowding managed to get enough political support to put together Fighter Command and its Dowding System of Command and Control...but Dowding was unpopular in powerful places.

When it became clear that Bomber Command was incapable of delivering a "knock out blow" to Germany in 1940 the pro-bomber advocates were severely embarrassed by Fighter Command's successes.

Was the Big Wing fiasco used by Dowding's political enemies to help bring him down?

The Duxford Big Wing was formed after only a telephone discussion between Leigh-Mallory and Bader with little planning and with no discussion or agreement with Fighter Command. Bader had great enthusiasm for a Big Wing and Leigh-Mallory took him at his word.

Is it dubious, or reckless, or negligent that a senior commander should take the word of an inexperienced junior officer and unilaterally commit to such a poorly executed experiment at such a critical time? And why did he put one of his least experienced Squadron Leaders in charge of such a difficult-to-lead unit?

Bader did not always follow ground control instructions and often flew into 11 Group's area on his own initiative leaving Fighter Command unable to use the Big Wing in any coordinated way and many times it was caught out of position and unable to do good.

Ironically Leigh-Mallory complained to Park during the Battle (according to McInstry), "Full explanation required why 11 Group fighters have shot down enemy fighters over 12 Group area."

At a meeting of the Air Council on 17 October 1940, Dowding and Park found themselves on the defensive. Park started to monitor the effectiveness of Leigh-Mallory's big wings and submitted a report which showed that in ten separate sorties in the second half of October they had managed to shoot down just one German aircraft. But nobody was interested. It would seem that political interests, not military evidence, was guiding those at the highest levels.

Despite having won the Battle of Britain, Dowding retired from his post in November 1940 and Keith Park was removed as commander of 11 Group and sent to Training Command. Park was replaced by Leigh-Mallory who brought his Big Wing ideas south. Leigh-Mallory would seem to have had sympathies in high places for his opinions and actions.

Dowding's career was over but Park would eventually be given commands as befitting his talents: Malta, Sicily and North Africa.

The Big Wing may not have played an important tactical role in Battle of Britain
...but it played a crucial role in the outcome of the political conspiracy against Dowding

When the Air Ministry's Historical Branch first published its account of the Battle of Britain, there was no mention of Hugh Dowding or Keith Park. It was only at Churchill's insistence that they were eventually included.

In a letter Park wrote at the time (McInstry), "Frankly I was more worried about the lack of cooperation (with Leigh-Mallory) than I was about out-witting the massed German raids."

Once Leigh-Mallory was in post at 11 Group in January 1941, a paper exercise was carried out to explore the effectiveness of a Big Wing within 11 Group. The intention was to prove the superiority of large formations using the circumstances of an actual attack on Kenley, Biggin Hill and Hornchurch sectors on 6 September 1940.

Leigh-Mallory mis-managed the operation, permitting the raid to progress unhindered which resulted in Kenley and Biggin Hill aerodromes being "bombed" whilst their aircraft were still on the ground.

We should perhaps be grateful that Leigh-Mallory wasn't successful in becoming 11 Group commander any sooner, the Battle of Britain may well have had a different outcome

by Steve Dunster

We Found my Dad's old Hurricane - in the Science Museum

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My Dad, Edgar Dunster, was ground crew for 615 Squadron at RAF Kenley during the Battle of Britain. 

During the mid to late 1970s we were on a family holiday and visited Torbary Aircraft Museum. My Dad froze and became very emotional, pointing at a Hawker Hurricane and said, "That's my aircraft!"

He was insistent! Apparently

"You never forget your aircraft's registration number!" 

...presumably because you're always writing it down on some form or other after you've worked on it.

All I can remember is that the Hurricane was in Battle of Britain colours, had the 615 Squadron "KW" markings and that Dad was insistent it was his. I did take a photo of it for him but I've no idea where that photo is now.

The guy in charge of the museum pricked Dad's bubble when he pointed out the Hurricane was a replica built for the 1966 film Battle of Britain, and was merely painted to look like Dad's aircraft.

You can imagine that Dad was feeling a little deflated but then he perked up when the guy said that the real one was in the Imperial War Museum.

As the years went by, remembering how emotional Dad had got at seeing his old aircraft, I kept suggesting we go to London to find it. My parents had a bit of a phobia about going to London and we never did but I never let go of the idea.

When I was old enough, I travelled to London on my own and visited the Imperial War Museum to try and find his aircraft. Sadly my trip was fruitless.

Years later I discovered that a new aircraft museum was being put together in Duxford near Cambridge and that it was part of the Imperial War Museum. So I figured that maybe his aircraft was there - but sadly not.

The trail had gone cold and Dad died in 1981 never having seen his aircraft.

After he died I got married and had two wonderful children and thought nothing more of Dad's old aircraft.

In 2014 I started a Battle of Britain Twitter account called @BofB1940 as a summer project with my eldest son (Kit) to teach him something of the workings of social media.

Using Battle of Britain records and history books I'd collected over the years, Kit and myself put together a real time Twitter feed for the Battle of Britain as if it was happening now.

Spurred on by the unexpected success of @BofB1940, Kit started avidly consuming Battle of Britain reading material. His eye was drawn to one article that I'd never read, about the Hurricane in the Science Museum.

Kit asked me to confirm that Dad's old squadron was 615 which I did.

Apparently when we had visited the Science museum as a family for the first time only months before, the Hurricane we'd seen was actually from Dad's old squadron.

Sadly I had no recollection of the registration number of Dad's old aircraft but I was lucky enough to find information from a Torbay Museum Guide that somebody had put on the Internet: it said

Hawker Hurricane KW-Z (replica for the Battle of Britain film)

This was progress, it told me that what Dad thought his old aircraft had the ident letter Z.

The article that Kit found said that the Science Museum Hurricane had the following markings during its time with 615 Squadron:

L1592   KW-Z

This gave me more information and Google was now able to tell me:

Replica BAPC.63: initially marked L1592 KW-Z; currently marked SD-T located at the Hawkinge Museum, Kent

Looking up the BAPC register, I was able to confirm that BAPC.63 was:

P3208/SD-T Hawker Hurricane (full scale model), Kent Battle of Britain Musuem, Hawkinge - built for the film "Battle of Britain" ex L1592

And for me this was conclusive proof:

• I had Torbay museum records from the Internet telling me what Dad saw was KW-Z. 
• I had aviation forums telling me the replica at Torbay was BAPC.63
• I had the BAPC register saying BAPC.63 was originally marked as L1592 KW-Z
• I had an article saying that L1592 was in the Science Museum and used to be marked KW-Z

So I am guessing when the guy at at Torbay Aircraft Museum said the original was in the Imperial War Museum, maybe he meant the Science Museum - or maybe there was a transfer from one to the other or maybe we weren't listening properly.

We had found Dad's aircraft and it was in the Science Museum and we had all seen it (without realising it was his) only months before.

I'd very much like to take my family back to the Science Museum soon, this time knowing that it was Dad's aircraft...and strangely I'd also like to visit the Hawkinge Battle of Britain Museum to see the exact replica that I stood in front of with my Dad...thinking it was his old aircraft.

Then a further realisation dawned. If L1592 was definitely Dad's aircraft then presumably Dad would have known its pilot.

Dad was at Kenley on 18 August when the aerodrome was bombed and Mum was in married quarters only a few miles away in Whyteleafe.

On that same day, Dad's old aircraft and pilot were up flying in combat. Len Deighton has documented what happened in his book Fighter - The True Story Of The Battle Of Britain:

18 August 1940

Pilot Officer D. J. Looker in KW-Z was at an even greater disadvantage than the rest of 615 Squadron, for his usual aircraft was damaged, forcing him to fly in a Hurricane I, from reserve. It had fabric-covered wings and its fuel tanks were not self-sealing. Worse, from a handling point of view, it had a de Havilland variable-pitch (two-pitch) airscrew instead of a Rotol constant-speed propeller. This meant inferior performance and more work for the pilot.

No. 615 Squadron were still using the old formation (four vees) and were flying tightly together in the pre-war style. Undoubtedly this made them easier to spot. They were bounced out of the sun by the Bf 109s they were looking for, and the tail of KW-Z was hit by cannon shells. The Hurricane went into a spin, but Looker was experienced enough to regain control of it. He was reluctant to bail out, having just spent a month in hospital with leg injuries after a dog-fight during the battles in France. He dodged through the balloon barrage cables that were there expressly to inhibit such flying, and then put the Hurricane down at the first landing field he saw. It was the pre-war London airport at Croydon. As he came in, he ran the gauntlet of the anti-aircraft guns who thought he was a German bomber.

Pilot Officer Looker survived, but incredibly one of the airport officials at Croydon made a written complaint about his airport being used as an emergency landing field. Looker's Hurricane also survived, to become an exhibit at London's Science Museum.

I am of course pleased that Dad's old aircraft still exists but I am absolutely delighted that it was only my son's involvement, the Grandson he never met, that was the key to the whole mystery:

Kit had finally found his Grandad's old aircraft. Something that easily brings a tear to my eye.

by Steve Dunster

Boulton-Paul Defiant: Stupid Idea or Dreadful Leadership?

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The Boulton-Paul Defiant has been the subject of much discussion on the @BofB1940 twitter feed. Most have the view that the aircraft is a flawed concept, an idea that couldn't possibly have worked, an idea that needlessly cost lives.

A small minority on the @BofB1940 feed have defended the aircraft saying that it was Fighter Command's mis-use of the aircraft that was flawed, not the design concept. 

Slaughter of the Innocents

On the 19th July 1940, No 141 Squadron (Defiants) sent up nine aircraft (together with a Spitfire squadron and a Hurricane squadron) to intercept Bf110s that were reportedly dive bombing shipping off Dover. 

Whilst they were still climbing, a group of Bf109s were sweeping high above the English Channel with perfect visibility. Undetected by the climbing Defiants, the Bf109s performed the perfect bounce and attacked from the sun.

The brief but brutal combat resulted in the loss of six out of the nine Defiants and signalled the end of the RAF using them as daytime front-line fighters. No 141 Squadron was withdrawn to 13 Group and the Defiant was eventually relegated to that of a night fighter role.

Stupid Idea?

Many people (like me) think that a fighter the size of a Spitfire with a less powerful engine, with the extra weight of a second crew member and a one ton turret is a really stupid idea.

If you then take that stupid idea and make sure that the pilot has no forward firing armaments and that the turret can only fire upwards and that the gunner has to constantly tell the pilot what he's trying to shoot at - then this must surely be the most monumentally stupid idea of all human conflict?

Such people (like me) can't understand why on earth the Boulton-Paul Defiant could possibly have been deployed into 11 Group as a day time front line fighter in Hell Fire Corner. We assumed that this "stupid idea" must have seemed a "good idea" a long time before the War, like the Blenheim, but by the time war broke out, it was out-dated. If that's true, what was it doing in Hell Fire Corner?

The Defiant at its Best

It turns out that the Boulton-Paul Defiant was actually the newest fighter in the RAF which would explain why it was used in front-line day time duties in Fighter Command.

Sadly the Defiant wasn't designed as a fighter to take on single seat fighters, it was designed as a Bomber Destroyer to kill unescorted bombers.

During the Winter of 1940, No 264 Squadron was equipped with the first ever Defiants. They developed new tactics for the new type. 

No 264 Squadron was Operational in March 1940 and was highly successful in the Battle for France.

A properly trained Defiant squadron, it would seem, can be highly successful at destroying Ju87s, He111s and Ju88s. A valuable asset indeed for the Battle of Britain

No 264 Squadron (Defiants) had 64 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed for a loss of 14 Defiants.

141 Squadron had its Own Ideas

No 141 Squadron was the second squadron to be equipped with Defiants but decided they would take little notice of the tactics developed by the highly successful 264 Squadron before it.

When 141 Squadron was thrown into the heat of battle on 19 July 1940, it had none of the well trained, well thought through, tried and battle-tested tactics of 264 Squadron.

Defiants couldn't Speak to Spitfire or Hurricane Squadrons

One of the shortcomings of the Defiant (as highlighted by 264 Squadron but not fixed by Fighter Command) was that the Defiants were fitted with a different radio system to that of the rest of Fighter Command.

When No 141 Squadron was sent up to engage the enemy on 19 July 1940 with a Spitfire squadron and a Hurricane squadron, they had no method of communicating with them.

The Defiant was an Unescorted Bomber Destroyer

...so why on earth was 141 Squadron ever deployed to 11 Group. It was possibly the only Group in Fighter Command that was likely to have fighter escorted bombers almost all the time because it was so close to enemy airfields in France.

No 141 Squadron would presumably have been far better deployed to 13 Group in Scotland or the East Coast.

Stupid Idea or Dreadful Leadership?

Whilst I have always been of the view that the Boulton-Paul Defiant was a stupid idea, I had been ignorant of the tactics developed for it in 264 Squadron and how amazingly successful they had been in France.

I was also unaware that it's concept was one of the Unescorted Bomber Destroyer, for which (looking at 264's statistics) it would seem to have been remarkably well suited.

This does leave me with these three burning questions:

1. Why was No 141 Squadron leadership allowed to completely ignore battle-proven tactics as developed by No 264 Squadron and to go into battle on 19 July 1940 un-prepared?
2. Why was No 141 Squadron not deployed to a Group in Fighter Command where it was more likely to come across "unescorted bombers", like Scotland or the East Coast?
3. Why was the interoperability issue not addressed regarding the different radio systems used on Defiants?

For me, thanks to No 264 Squadron, I no longer consider the Defiant a stupid idea. 

It doesn't sound like a flawed concept but a niche and specialist role.

I have to say that I'm a convert. I now agree with the small minority on the @BofB1940 feed who say it wasn't the Defiant that was the problem, it was the leadership...the leadership of No 141 Squadron and the leadership of Fighter Command.

Churchill wanted Defiants but Dowding wanted Spitfires & Hurricanes

Churchill supported the concept of the Defiant but Dowding wanted fast single-seater forward-firing fighters.

Dowding only equipped two of his squadrons with Defiants and when one of them suffered heavy losses it gave him the ideal reason to withdraw Defiants from his front line.

Was it Dowding's lack of enthusiasm for the Defiant that created the conditions which led to a series of leadership failures that resulted in No 141 Squadron suffering such heavy losses?

Churchill later felt that he'd been wrong to support the Defiant...but maybe he hadn't been, maybe he'd been ignorant of the leadership failings surrounding No 141...he might even have been ignorant of the incredible successes of No 264 Squadron.

Why was No 264 Squadron Withdrawn from Operations?

By May 1940, the successful No 264 Squadron started to suffer mounting losses as the Luftwaffe discovered the Defiant was vulnerable to frontal attack. 264 was withdrawn from operations as a day fighter and started to train for the night fighter role.

Nevertheless, had Defiant squadrons been restricted to that of Unescorted Bomber Destroyer,  maybe 264 would have faired better.

Maybe it was right that the Defiants were withdrawn but maybe there was also an element of self-fulfillment about Dowding's prophecy.

Should the Defiant have been Withdrawn?

Is it possible that if enough Defiant squadrons had followed the battle-proven tactics and training of 264 

...and if Fighter Command and ensured that all Defiants could have communicated properly with their protecting Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons 

...and if Fighter Command had ensured that Defiants were largely engaging with unescorted bombers by deploying them into Scotland and the East Coast and freeing up single seat fighters for 11 Group,

...is it possible that the RAF's newest fighter, the Defiant, could have come out of the Battle of Britain with high scores and low losses

...and when we said the words Spitfire and Hurricane with patriotic pride, perhaps we might also have said Boulton-Paul Defiant.

by Steve Dunster

Stop the Traffic! We Want to Take Off!

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During the early part of the Battle of Britain, entries in the Campaign Diaries frequent mention is made of RAF Catterick in 13 Group being unserviceable.

Even when it was serviceable there was often a caveat saying "unserviceable during hours of darkness".

What could be the reason for the unreliable nature of this 13 Group Sector Station?

There is no explanation in the Campaign Diaries and there is no mention of any bomb damage putting it out of action.

I can not find any mention of it being an unreliable aerodrome or for being famous for its poor weather record.

RAF Catterick would appear to have only a single runway and I wondered if it might have been prone to flooding but I couldn't find any mention of it anywhere and let's face it...IT'S JULY...even in Scotland!

In summary, I'm not convinced that Catterick's poor serviceability record at the beginning of the Battle of Britain was either due to the weather or due to enemy action.

For me the most plausible reason occurred to me when I read an article in the Wartime Memories Project and it stated that:

The runway at Catterick was so close to the A1 that traffic had to be stopped to allow Spitfires to take off

For me, this would explain why it was unserviceable so often...in those days the A-roads were the main transport trunk roads, there were no motorways (unlike in Germany where Hitler had realised the benefit of a good road system to a mechanised army). So I think the RAF might have wanted to disrupt traffic on the A1 as few times as possible.

It also presumably meant that a Squadron Scramble order would have had a slower response, because you would have had to stop the traffic first.

If I was the RAF in the day, I'm sure I'd have thought, "If we've got any other options, let's try and not use Catterick!"

I think this might also explain why, even when Catterick was serviceable it was unserviceable during the hours of darkness...trying to stop traffic during the hours of darkness during a Blackout where none of the cars are allowed bright enough headlights...would be a positively dangerous occupation.

I'm guessing as the Battle of Britain intensified though, priorities changed and Catterick would have been used more and more...and somehow dealt with the traffic issues.

This is only my conjecture but it does allow for the historical interpretation that:

far from Catterick being frequently broken, I believe that instead it may have been frequently operational but just too close to the A1

...and the British being British, the RAF may have thought that to fly too often from Catterick would have been dreadfully inconsiderate...until later in the Battle of course when Catterick did tremendous work. 

by Steve Dunster

Aft Firing Bf109s? Seriously?

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The Battle of Britain Campaign Diaries have an Air Intelligence entry for 14 July 1940 that states:

British pilots again reporting Bf109s fitted with cannon firing aft

When @BofB1940 tweeted this it was the subject of great interest. Bf109s never had any kind of rear firing ordnance so why were there ongoing reports from British pilots that there were?

It seems completely fanciful that a British pilot would mis-identify a Bf109 with another Luftwaffe type that did fire backwards because all those two engines...except one.

The only single engined Luftwaffe aircraft that could fire backwards was the Ju87 Stuka but that was so distinctive with its fixed undercarriage and gull wings that it surely could not have been mixed up with a Bf109.

So mis-identification seems easy to rule out.

Another possibility might be that an unseen aircraft were firing at the British pilots who had attributed it to an aft firing Bf109 that they were chasing.

The best clue for the most plausible explanation came from a passage, pointed out to us from one of our followers, from Adolf Galland's The First And The Last.

Adolf Galland explained how he had got into a bit of a fix later in the war in his Fw190. In the passage he describes how he'd got himself into a weak position with no good options with enemy fighters on his tail. He describes how he used a technique that had already saved his life twice during the Battle of Britain, which was:

to fire everything he had into the clear blue sky ahead and it fooled the enemy fighters into thinking he was firing back at them and they broke off the engagement.

Adolf Galland was a very influential German fighter pilot during the Battle of Britain and it seems likely that if this technique had saved his life a couple of times, he might have recommended it to his pilots under his command.

I guess if you think you are chasing an enemy aircraft, he is completely defenceless and you have him in your sights, both of you know that this can only end one way...when...there is belching smoke from his guns. It's probably human nature to fear the worst and assume that he's firing back at you, after all...why on earth would he fire forwards.

In the highly charged atmosphere of mortal aerial combat and in the knowledge that you are fighting an ingenious enemy who is always making violent improvements to his aircraft...I guess the natural reaction would be to play safe and bunk out.

After all, a "dumb" (fixed position) machine gun was actually fitted into the tail of some He111s (just behind the rudder) and the Luftwaffe even experimented with fitting aft-firing flame-throwers to some of their aircraft. The flame-thrower idea was short-lived though once they realised the sight of the easily seen flame attracted more British fighters than it scared off.

Thank you to all those who took part in the debate on Twitter. 

If you're not already following us, do follow @BofB1940 for real time tweets of aircraft crashes, pilots, places, engagements, news and facts.

See you over there

by Steve Dunster