Showing posts with label He111. Show all posts
Showing posts with label He111. Show all posts

Tuesday, 5 July 2016

Why did the Ju 88 Germany's newest bomber suffer so many losses?

During the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe employed three types of level bombers and one type of dive bomber.

The dive bomber was the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka. It was primarily designed for troops support and it was devastatingly successful in this role during the Battle of France. But during the Battle of Britain, the Stuka suffered heavy losses due to its slow speed and it being vulnerable to fighter interception after diving on its target. The Stuka had limited payload and range and when its losses increased they were removed from operations over England.

The Luftwaffe had three bomber types it used for medium and high altitude level bombing, they were the Heinkel He 111, the Dornier Do 17 and the Junkers Ju 88.

Of these the He 111 was used in the greatest numbers and was the slowest. The Ju 88 was the newest and the fastest once it had dropped its mainly external bomb load. The Do 17 had the smallest bomb load.

All three level bomber types suffered heavy losses from British fighters but the Ju 88 disproportionately so.

Germany's newest bomber

The Junkers Ju 88 was developed in the late 1930s as a "fast-bomber" - a concept based on the fact that the Ju 88 would be supposedly so fast that fighters couldn't intercept it.

When the prototype Ju 88 V1 first flew, it achieved 360 mph. Georing (head of the Luftwaffe) was very impressed. Its streamlined fuselage was modelled on the Do 17 but with fewer defensive guns because of the belief that it could out-run late 1930s fighters.

Sadly by the time Luftwaffe planners like Ernst Udet had "improved" it with features added (including modifying it for heavy dive-bombing), the Ju 88's top speed had dropped to 280 mph.

The A-1 series prototypes were given Jumo 211B-1 or G powerplants and was the favoured variant by Georing for mass production. He was promised 300 Ju 88s a month.

Production was delayed terribly by developmental problems, causing service introduction to be over a year late. Only 12 Ju 88s were in service by the time Germany invaded Poland.

Even then, production was dreadfully slow with only one Ju 88 manufactured a week as problems continued.

How bad were the Ju 88 losses over Britain?

By August 1940 Ju 88 A-1s and A-5s were reaching operational units just as the Battle of Britain was intensifying.

Sadly for the Luftwaffe, the Ju 88s higher speed did not prevent its losses exceeding those of the Do 17 and the He 111.

Ju 88 losses over Britain between July and October 1940 amounted to 303 aircraft.
Do 17 losses over Britain between July and October 1940 amounted to 132 aircraft.
He 111 losses over Britain between July and October 1940 amounted to 252 aircraft.

Why did the Junkers Ju 88 suffer so many losses?

A considerable number of the Ju 88 losses were down to the aircraft's difficult behaviour compared with the proven He 111, and the crews' lack of experience on the type. Many crews had only converted to the Ju 88 only shortly before.

Of the 39 losses recorded for July 1940, only 20 were due to enemy action. The others were due to training accidents, crashes or malfunctions over mainland Europe.

A series of field modifications were implemented to make the Ju 88 less vulnerable, including replacing the single MG 15 rear machine gun with a twin-barrelled MG 81Z machine gun and fitting additional cockpit armour.

Arrival of the Flagship Ju 88 A-4

The Ju 88 A-4 went into service only during the closing days of the Battle of Britain. Although the A-4 was even slower than the A-1, it had ironed out nearly all of the problems of the A-1. The A-4 brought in additional improvements including more powerful engines.

It was the arrival of the A-4 that signalled the maturing of the Ju 88 into one of the most versatile combat aircraft of the Second World War. It was eventually used successfully as a bomber, dive bomber, night fighter, torpedo bomber, reconnaissance aircraft, heavy fighter and even as a flying bomb in the closing stages of the War.


by Steve Dunster

Monday, 10 August 2015

"A War Against England is Quite Out of the Question", Hitler 1938


During the Summer of 1940, Germany came perilously close to winning the Battle of Britain by destroying RAF Fighter Command over Southern England and allowing Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of England, to begin.

During the Spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe had been highly successful in the tactical close-air-support role of Germany's Blitzkrieg (lightning war) across Europe but it was it's strategic bombing role in the Blitz (bombing of British cities) from September 1940 onwards, that lost Germany the air war over England.

Germany's pre-war thinking was very much that the Luftwaffe's primary role was as tactical close air support for the army. This proved most successful in Poland, Belgium and France.

Ironically, if the Luftwaffe had remained in the tactical role of destroying Fighter Command airfields, it may well have won the Battle of Britain - it was only when it turned to strategic attacks on cities (for which the Luftwaffe had not designed) that the Battle started to turn in Britain's favour.

Tactical Good - Strategic Bad!

Between the wars, the German military were working on the assumption that the prospects of peace in Europe after 1940 were doubtful. The Luftwaffe was therefore instructed to prepare for war with a target date of 1943.

Germany's first consideration was for land wars with its European neighbours which led it to the conclusion that the Luftwaffe's primary role was to support the army.

Dive Bombers Good - Level Bombers Bad

Severe shortages in munitions led it to  an almost obsessive preference of dive-bombing over level bombing. Dive bombing was very much more accurate, which would considered or critical importance due to the desperate shortage of munitions available to Germany.

The demand for bombs would be so great during the Polish campaign that for a while concrete bombs filled with shrapnel were produced to cover shortages.

Medium Bombers Good - Heavy Bombers Bad

The severe shortages in petroleum products meant it could not run a heavy bomber force for strategic bombing. The proportion of resources that a heavy bomber capability would take from the Luftwaffe's petroleum products budget was considered to be much too big for the small benefit they thought they might get from it.

Another reason a heavy bomber force was never developed was the lack of suitable engines to power a heavy bomber. This was partly due to the late start that German engineers had in designing high-performance engine types and partly due to the low octane fuels available to operate them.

Germany entered the war using 87-89 octane fuels. In contrast, during the Battle of Britain, the British were using 100 octane rules supplied by the United States.

German industry had designed some successful heavy bombers but the Luftwaffe would never get to use them.

Development of German Bomber Types

Between the wars, Germany was rapidly building an air force and designing the aircraft that it should comprise of. From concept to production of a new aircraft type, it could take the best part of five years. This allowed for only two or three generations of aircraft before their target date of being ready for war by 1943. Between 1919 and 1929 the speed, range and bomb load of a typical bomber had more than doubled.

In 1934 a medium bomber specification was issues and the Dornier Do17 and the Heinkel He111 were selected for further development but these would continue to have shortcomings which led to the development of the Junkers Ju88 "fast bomber".

The original Ju88 had very impressive performance which was the spoilt by the German authority's insistence on it being modified to have a dive-bombing capability.

"A War Against England is Quite Out of the Question"

Hitler told Georing in the Summer of 1938 that:

"a war against England is quite out of the question!" 
[The Luftwaffe War Diaries, Bekker 1968] 

It is this, together with shortages of munitions and petroleum products that sealed the fete of Germany's expensive heavy bombers. Emphasis would instead be put into larger numbers of the fast, light, twin-engined medium bombers which were accurate and ideal for close air support of land forces.

Hitler hadn't expected a war with England and the Luftwaffe hadn't prepared for it. But had Germany produced a heavy bomber capability in time for use against England's cities as well as its airfields, the levels of destruction, and even the very outcome of the Battle of Britain itself, could well have been different.


by Steve Dunster

Saturday, 18 July 2015

Boulton-Paul Defiant: Stupid Idea or Dreadful Leadership?


The Boulton-Paul Defiant has been the subject of much discussion on the @BofB1940 twitter feed. Most have the view that the aircraft is a flawed concept, an idea that couldn't possibly have worked, an idea that needlessly cost lives.

A small minority on the @BofB1940 feed have defended the aircraft saying that it was Fighter Command's mis-use of the aircraft that was flawed, not the design concept. 

Slaughter of the Innocents

On the 19th July 1940, No 141 Squadron (Defiants) sent up nine aircraft (together with a Spitfire squadron and a Hurricane squadron) to intercept Bf110s that were reportedly dive bombing shipping off Dover. 

Whilst they were still climbing, a group of Bf109s were sweeping high above the English Channel with perfect visibility. Undetected by the climbing Defiants, the Bf109s performed the perfect bounce and attacked from the sun.

The brief but brutal combat resulted in the loss of six out of the nine Defiants and signalled the end of the RAF using them as daytime front-line fighters. No 141 Squadron was withdrawn to 13 Group and the Defiant was eventually relegated to that of a night fighter role.

Stupid Idea?

Many people (like me) think that a fighter the size of a Spitfire with a less powerful engine, with the extra weight of a second crew member and a one ton turret is a really stupid idea.

If you then take that stupid idea and make sure that the pilot has no forward firing armaments and that the turret can only fire upwards and that the gunner has to constantly tell the pilot what he's trying to shoot at - then this must surely be the most monumentally stupid idea of all human conflict?

Such people (like me) can't understand why on earth the Boulton-Paul Defiant could possibly have been deployed into 11 Group as a day time front line fighter in Hell Fire Corner. We assumed that this "stupid idea" must have seemed a "good idea" a long time before the War, like the Blenheim, but by the time war broke out, it was out-dated. If that's true, what was it doing in Hell Fire Corner?

The Defiant at its Best

It turns out that the Boulton-Paul Defiant was actually the newest fighter in the RAF which would explain why it was used in front-line day time duties in Fighter Command.

Sadly the Defiant wasn't designed as a fighter to take on single seat fighters, it was designed as a Bomber Destroyer to kill unescorted bombers.

During the Winter of 1940, No 264 Squadron was equipped with the first ever Defiants. They developed new tactics for the new type. 

No 264 Squadron was Operational in March 1940 and was highly successful in the Battle for France.

A properly trained Defiant squadron, it would seem, can be highly successful at destroying Ju87s, He111s and Ju88s. A valuable asset indeed for the Battle of Britain

No 264 Squadron (Defiants) had 64 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed for a loss of 14 Defiants.


141 Squadron had its Own Ideas

No 141 Squadron was the second squadron to be equipped with Defiants but decided they would take little notice of the tactics developed by the highly successful 264 Squadron before it.

When 141 Squadron was thrown into the heat of battle on 19 July 1940, it had none of the well trained, well thought through, tried and battle-tested tactics of 264 Squadron.

Defiants couldn't Speak to Spitfire or Hurricane Squadrons

One of the shortcomings of the Defiant (as highlighted by 264 Squadron but not fixed by Fighter Command) was that the Defiants were fitted with a different radio system to that of the rest of Fighter Command.

When No 141 Squadron was sent up to engage the enemy on 19 July 1940 with a Spitfire squadron and a Hurricane squadron, they had no method of communicating with them.

The Defiant was an Unescorted Bomber Destroyer

...so why on earth was 141 Squadron ever deployed to 11 Group. It was possibly the only Group in Fighter Command that was likely to have fighter escorted bombers almost all the time because it was so close to enemy airfields in France.

No 141 Squadron would presumably have been far better deployed to 13 Group in Scotland or the East Coast.

Stupid Idea or Dreadful Leadership?

Whilst I have always been of the view that the Boulton-Paul Defiant was a stupid idea, I had been ignorant of the tactics developed for it in 264 Squadron and how amazingly successful they had been in France.

I was also unaware that it's concept was one of the Unescorted Bomber Destroyer, for which (looking at 264's statistics) it would seem to have been remarkably well suited.

This does leave me with these three burning questions:
  1. Why was No 141 Squadron leadership allowed to completely ignore battle-proven tactics as developed by No 264 Squadron and to go into battle on 19 July 1940 un-prepared?
  2. Why was No 141 Squadron not deployed to a Group in Fighter Command where it was more likely to come across "unescorted bombers", like Scotland or the East Coast?
  3. Why was the interoperability issue not addressed regarding the different radio systems used on Defiants?
For me, thanks to No 264 Squadron, I no longer consider the Defiant a stupid idea. 

It doesn't sound like a flawed concept but a niche and specialist role.

I have to say that I'm a convert. I now agree with the small minority on the @BofB1940 feed who say it wasn't the Defiant that was the problem, it was the leadership...the leadership of No 141 Squadron and the leadership of Fighter Command.

Churchill wanted Defiants but Dowding wanted Spitfires & Hurricanes

Churchill supported the concept of the Defiant but Dowding wanted fast single-seater forward-firing fighters.

Dowding only equipped two of his squadrons with Defiants and when one of them suffered heavy losses it gave him the ideal reason to withdraw Defiants from his front line.

Was it Dowding's lack of enthusiasm for the Defiant that created the conditions which led to a series of leadership failures that resulted in No 141 Squadron suffering such heavy losses?

Churchill later felt that he'd been wrong to support the Defiant...but maybe he hadn't been, maybe he'd been ignorant of the leadership failings surrounding No 141...he might even have been ignorant of the incredible successes of No 264 Squadron.

Why was No 264 Squadron Withdrawn from Operations?

By May 1940, the successful No 264 Squadron started to suffer mounting losses as the Luftwaffe discovered the Defiant was vulnerable to frontal attack. 264 was withdrawn from operations as a day fighter and started to train for the night fighter role.

Nevertheless, had Defiant squadrons been restricted to that of Unescorted Bomber Destroyer,  maybe 264 would have faired better.

Maybe it was right that the Defiants were withdrawn but maybe there was also an element of self-fulfillment about Dowding's prophecy.

Should the Defiant have been Withdrawn?

Is it possible that if enough Defiant squadrons had followed the battle-proven tactics and training of 264 

...and if Fighter Command and ensured that all Defiants could have communicated properly with their protecting Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons 

...and if Fighter Command had ensured that Defiants were largely engaging with unescorted bombers by deploying them into Scotland and the East Coast and freeing up single seat fighters for 11 Group,

...is it possible that the RAF's newest fighter, the Defiant, could have come out of the Battle of Britain with high scores and low losses

...and when we said the words Spitfire and Hurricane with patriotic pride, perhaps we might also have said Boulton-Paul Defiant.

by Steve Dunster