Showing posts with label hugh dowding. Show all posts
Showing posts with label hugh dowding. Show all posts

Friday, 21 August 2015

Some Squadrons had to be Replaced after a Week


Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding was a big advocate of squadron rotation to give respite and time for training. The Luftwaffe on the other hand kept their units continuously in the front line.

Even as far back as July 1915 after the Battle of the Somme, Dowding was a strong supporter of pilot rotation.  When Dowding was commanding officer of No 16 Squadron, he clashed with General Trenchard, commander of the RFC, over the need to rest pilots exhausted by non-stop duty.


Here's how squadron rotation worked during the Battle of Britain, in Dowding's own words:


A fresh squadron coming into an active Sector would generally bring with them sixteen aircraft and about twenty trained pilots. They would normally fight until they were no longer capable of putting more than nine aircraft into the air, and then they had to be relieved.

This process occupied different periods according to the luck and skill of the unit. The normal period was a month to six weeks, but some units had to be replaced after a week or ten days.

By the beginning of September, the incidence of casualties became so serious that a fresh squadron would become depleted and exhausted before any of the resting and reforming squadrons was ready to take its place.

Fighter pilots still could not be turned out by the training units in numbers sufficient to fill the widening gaps in the fighting ranks. Transfers were made from the Fleet Air Arm and from the Bomber and Coastal Commands, but these pilots naturally required a short flying course on Hurricanes and Spitfires and some instruction in formation flying, fighter tactics and interception procedure.

by Steve Dunster

Hugh Dowding, architect of the Battle of Britain


Hugh Dowding won us the Battle of Britain 

Was he rewarded? 

No! He was sacked!

The Battle of Britain was never part of Germany's war plan. If it had of been they would have built a strategic bomber force but their intent was to subdue the UK into taking no part in hostilities.

Hitler had assured Goering in 1938 that "War with England was quite out of the question". Even as late as August 1940 Hitler was hoping that the UK would sue for peace and forbad terror bombing of English cities.

The Battle of Britain was not even in the fore-minds of many of those at the Air Ministry or high up in the Royal Air Force. In 1932 British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin declared that "The bomber will always get through" and many people in positions of authority agreed with him.

There was a popular view that there was little point having a fighter defence system and that the only way to win an air war was to have sufficient bombers at your disposal so as to be able to deliver a "knock-out" blow to the enemy in response.

Dowding disagreed with Baldwin and all his supporters. He could foresee an air war that Baldwin thought would never happen but an air war that we now call the Battle of Britain.

Dowding was right. He confronted the political heavy-weights who advocated "the bomber will always get through" and won, but not without making political enemies.

The "Dowding System"

In July 1936 Dowding was appointed commanding officer of the newly created RAF Fighter Command. The integrated air defence system he put together had the following elements:

1. Radar (Dowding was one of the first to see its potential)
2. Royal Observer Corps (who filled in the gaps of radar coverage)
3. Raid Plotting
4. Radio control of aircraft

He ensured that the network was linked by dedicated telephone cables buried sufficiently deeply to provide protection against bombing. The network had its centre at a converted country house on the outskirts of London, RAF Bentley Priory.

The system as a whole later became known as Ground Control Interception (GCI) but is still referred to as the "Dowding System."

Introduction of New Aircraft

Dowding introduced modern aircraft into the service including the Spitfire and Hurricane. He was not a supporter of the Defiant, instead he felt that the best fighters were those that were forward firing and aimed by the pilot.

He is credited with having taken on the Air Ministry and won to ensure that fighter aircraft were equipped with bullet proof wind shields.

Battle of Britain

Dowding resisted repeated requests from Prime Minister Winston Churchill to weaken the home defence by sending precious squadrons to France before it fell.

Yet again, Dowding had determined a carefully thought through path and faced-down political heavy-weights, but with political cost.

During the Battle itself the Dowding System worked as a force-multiplier, getting much greater benefit from the small forces at his disposal.

Dowding's major contribution during the Battle was to marshal resources behind the scenes including replacement aircraft and air crew. He left his subordinate commanders more or less a free hand to run the battle in detail.

Dowding's Downfall after Victory

Dowding had foreseen the Battle of Britain, prepared for it, fought it and won it. At each of these stages he had carefully considered his options, chosen what turned out to be correct choices but in the process he made resentful political enemies.

"The bomber will always get through" supporters thought money should be spent on building a stronger bomber force not wasted on his Fighter Command approach.

During the Battle of Britain it became clear to all that Bomber Command was nowhere near strong enough to be capable of delivering the "knock-out blow" required to deter Germany from bombing England. As Dowding's Fighter Command approach was seen to be succeeding, resentment against him grew.

Dowding's strategy of preserving his fighter reserve by using guerrilla tactics against large bomber formations as directed by his ground controllers proved highly successful. At the height of the Battle his approach was challenged strongly by 12 Group commander Leigh-Mallory and Acting Squadron Leader Douglas Bader. They strongly advocated the unwieldy and ineffective Big Wing approach of forming up three or more squadrons before engaging the enemy. As Keith Park pointed out, Big Wings were too slow to form up and usually in the wrong place.

History gives us the hindsight of knowing that Dowding's choices were correct but political momentum seemed again to have been with his adversaries.

As the RAF began to win the air war over England it was inevitable that the daylight skies would be cleared and German bombers would restrict their operations to night bombing. Dowding knew this would happen and also knew that the only answer to this lay in the development of Airborne Interception Radar. His efforts to bring AI radar into service had been frustrated by those around him but when the night Blitz of London started and AI radar wasn't ready, political pressure was applied to him.

A committee of enquiry chaired by Sir John Salmond produced a long list of recommendations to improve night air defence. Dowding approved only a selection of Salmond's recommendations. Churchill and Lord Beaverbrook decided it was time for Dowding to step down.

Personally I don't know what the recommendations were but it seems entirely in Dowding's character to have carefully considered all the options and only backed those he thought of value...and he may have been right...but those panicked by the politics caused by the dreadful bombings would have wanted to have seen every possible action taken.

Dowding was unwillingly replaced in command in November 1940 by Big Wing advocate Sholto Douglas.

If you want to know more about how Dowding and his 11 Group commander Keith Park suffered politically after their victory of the Battle of Britain, you may like to read our blog about it: 
Big Wing or Political Conspiracy

The Gratitude of Every Home in Our Island?

It seems sad that it was Churchill's words about the gratitude of the whole nation going out to those who'd eventually win us that Battle of Britain, and that it was Churchill who sided with Dowding's political adversaries in his sacking.

The lack of gratitude felt by Dowding when he was sacked by Churchill after he won the Battle of Britain must have been remarkably similar to that that Churchill wrote about after losing the 1945 General Election having won the War.

In the Words of His Pilots

Squadron Leader George Darley

Dowding was too nice a chap and he came up against a gang of thugs. Leigh-Mallory was very jealous of him. He felt he wasn't getting enough of the limelight and he got a lot of backing in the Air Ministry.

Flight Lieutenant Francis Wilkinson

It was entirely [Dowding's] foresight in being able to see where the strain was going to come, and to be able to take the measure of that strain, which allowed Fighter Command to bear the enormous, almost unbearable load that it had when the fighting came. Stuffy (the pilot's nickname for Dowding) had foreseen that our fighter squadrons were going to be depleted in strength. He had foreseen that Sector Operations Room would be bombed. And he'd made plans for the rapid interchange of squadrons between Scotland and Northern England and the South. If it hadn't been for his colossal foresight and meticulous planning right from the very beginning, we'd have had it.

Squadron Leader Sandy Johnstone

After Stuffy was made to retire the war blew up into a global thing. Great names arose - Eisenhower, Montgomery, Alexander, Bradley. Great battles were won - Alamein, D-Day, the crossing of the Rhine. But they were all courtesy of Stuffy Dowding. None of these people would even have been heard of if Stuffy hadn't been there, if he hadn't won the Battle of Britain. His statue ought to be standing atop a plinth in Trafalgar Square.


My Personal Opinion

Dowding was known for his humility and great sincerity and was widely considered by his pilots as a leader who cared for his men and had their best interests at heart.

He often referred to his "dear fighter boys" as his "chicks", in fact his son Derek was one of them.

Dowding seems to have been a thoughtful and clever man. A man who felt that the burden of command was to determine the best answer and fight for its implementation whatever the political cost.

All politics can do is get you sacked...but being wrong can get people killed!

Luckily for us he achieved great things, 
things that we could easily look back on and say that "This was our Finest Hour"
...sadly he suffered terribly at "man's ingratitude".


The inscription at the foot of Dowding's statue outside St Clement Danes church on the Strand in London, is one of the finest tributes to him I have read and I share it with you:

Air Chief Marshal Lord Dowding was commander-in-chief of Fighter Command, Royal Air Force, from its formation in 1936 until November 1940. 
He was thus responsible for the preparation for and the conduct of the Battle of Britain. With remarkable foresight, he ensured the equipment of his command with monoplane fighters, the Hurricane and the Spitfire. 
He was among the first to appreciate the vital importance of R.D.F. (radar) and an effective command and control system for his squadrons. 
They were ready when war came. 
In the preliminary stages of that war, he thoroughly trained his minimal forces and conserved them against strong political pressure to disperse and misuse them. 
His wise and prudent judgement and leadership helped to ensure victory against overwhelming odds and thus prevented the loss of the Battle of Britain and probably the whole war. 
To him, the people of Britain and of the Free World owe largely the way of life and the liberties they enjoy today


If you want to know more about how Dowding and his 11 Group commander Keith Park suffered politically after their victory of the Battle of Britain, you may like to read our blog about it:
Big Wing or Political Conspiracy

by Steve Dunster




Wednesday, 22 July 2015

Big Wing or Political Conspiracy?


The term "Big Wing" refers to the aerial combat tactic of having several squadrons in a single formation and was contraversially adopted during the Battle of Britain by 12 Group commander Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory and Acting Squadron Leader Douglas Bader.

Initially the Duxford Wing (as it became known) had comprised 242, 310 and 19 Squadrons but later 302 and 611 Squadrons were also added.

It was thought larger formations (Big Wings) would facilitate the shooting down of higher numbers of enemy aircraft and incur fewer losses than using smaller formations. Sadly large formations were slow to deploy, difficult to manage in the air and chaotic in battle.

Leigh-Mallory and Bader of 12 Group felt there were huge advantages in having large formations to attack the enemy.

Dowding (commanding officer of Fighter Command) and Park (commander of 11 Group) strongly felt the opposite. Park had tried using Wings in the defence of the Dunkirk beaches and found them to be unwieldy, chaotic and often in the wrong place.

History has sided strongly with Dowding and Park

The Park approach of sending up single squadrons one after another to harass enemy formations on the way to their target was highly successful at protecting targets from the worst excesses of the raid and in the shooting down of enemy aircraft. Sadly it was costly and the tactic was not popular with some of his pilots because of the large losses.

This guerrilla approach to aerial combat was exactly right for the war Park had to fight but it made huge demands on the pilots' bravery and skill...nevertheless it protected targets and shot down enemy aircraft.

The Big Wing by comparison rarely engaged with the enemy (prior to the Luftwaffe raids on London) because it took too long to form up, was often in the wrong place, was unwieldy if it did engage and the increased chaos during combat resulted in much over-claiming of their successes. The Big Wing's actual successes turned out to be a fraction of what was claimed.

The supporters of the Big Wing would point out its high claims and low losses. Even at the time, the claims were thought to have been exaggerated and their low loss rate was accountable to the fact they had rarely engaged with the enemy.

So the Big Wing was an utter failure? Perhaps not...

History's assessment of the Big Wing's performance has been to assume its somewhat haphazard formation was solely intended to destroy enemy aircraft and protect intended targets...a purpose it was patently unsuited for according to the historic record.

But perhaps its purpose was not just to attack the Luftwaffe...it would seem that the Big Wing was an effective political device for use against Dowding.

Hugh Trenchard (founder of the RAF) had apparently clashed with Dowding when they were both commanders in the Royal Flying Corps during WW1.

Trenchard had retired by the time WW2 had started but was still influential at the highest levels of the RAF and Air Ministry.

Trenchard and his supporters felt that "the bomber would always get through" and that the only effective means of defending against bombing raids was to deliver a "knock out blow" by sending our own bombers back in response.

There was a strong feeling by some that Fighter Command was the wrong approach when it came to defence against bombers. Fortunately, Dowding managed to get enough political support to put together Fighter Command and its Dowding System of Command and Control...but Dowding was unpopular in powerful places.

When it became clear that Bomber Command was incapable of delivering a "knock out blow" to Germany in 1940 the pro-bomber advocates were severely embarrassed by Fighter Command's successes.

Was the Big Wing fiasco used by Dowding's political enemies to help bring him down?

The Duxford Big Wing was formed after only a telephone discussion between Leigh-Mallory and Bader with little planning and with no discussion or agreement with Fighter Command. Bader had great enthusiasm for a Big Wing and Leigh-Mallory took him at his word.

Is it dubious, or reckless, or negligent that a senior commander should take the word of an inexperienced junior officer and unilaterally commit to such a poorly executed experiment at such a critical time? And why did he put one of his least experienced Squadron Leaders in charge of such a difficult-to-lead unit?

Bader did not always follow ground control instructions and often flew into 11 Group's area on his own initiative leaving Fighter Command unable to use the Big Wing in any coordinated way and many times it was caught out of position and unable to do good.

Ironically Leigh-Mallory complained to Park during the Battle (according to McInstry), "Full explanation required why 11 Group fighters have shot down enemy fighters over 12 Group area."

At a meeting of the Air Council on 17 October 1940, Dowding and Park found themselves on the defensive. Park started to monitor the effectiveness of Leigh-Mallory's big wings and submitted a report which showed that in ten separate sorties in the second half of October they had managed to shoot down just one German aircraft. But nobody was interested. It would seem that political interests, not military evidence, was guiding those at the highest levels.

Despite having won the Battle of Britain, Dowding retired from his post in November 1940 and Keith Park was removed as commander of 11 Group and sent to Training Command. Park was replaced by Leigh-Mallory who brought his Big Wing ideas south. Leigh-Mallory would seem to have had sympathies in high places for his opinions and actions.

Dowding's career was over but Park would eventually be given commands as befitting his talents: Malta, Sicily and North Africa.

The Big Wing may not have played an important tactical role in Battle of Britain
...but it played a crucial role in the outcome of the political conspiracy against Dowding

When the Air Ministry's Historical Branch first published its account of the Battle of Britain, there was no mention of Hugh Dowding or Keith Park. It was only at Churchill's insistence that they were eventually included.

In a letter Park wrote at the time (McInstry), "Frankly I was more worried about the lack of cooperation (with Leigh-Mallory) than I was about out-witting the massed German raids."

Once Leigh-Mallory was in post at 11 Group in January 1941, a paper exercise was carried out to explore the effectiveness of a Big Wing within 11 Group. The intention was to prove the superiority of large formations using the circumstances of an actual attack on Kenley, Biggin Hill and Hornchurch sectors on 6 September 1940.

Leigh-Mallory mis-managed the operation, permitting the raid to progress unhindered which resulted in Kenley and Biggin Hill aerodromes being "bombed" whilst their aircraft were still on the ground.


We should perhaps be grateful that Leigh-Mallory wasn't successful in becoming 11 Group commander any sooner, the Battle of Britain may well have had a different outcome

by Steve Dunster