The Attack Dive of a Ju87 Stuka

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The Junkers Ju87 Stuka dive-bomber was one of the most iconic German aircraft of the early part of the war. With its inverted gull-shaped wings, fixed undercarriage and distinctive spats over its wheels, visually there was nothing else like it.

At first sight the Ju87 looks to be ungainly, unlikely and dated. Actually it was a thorough-bred and the work that Junkers put into its development was extraordinary. It was designed as a precision dive-bomber for close-air support for the German army and in this role it reigned supreme.

The Ju87 was not only incredibly accurate but also truly terrifying. The troops being bombed by it knew they were the target because it was screaming and pointing at them. To augment the Ju87's well-known whistling, the crews attacked sirens, "Trumpets of Jericho", to the landing gear as an added psychological weapon (though this wasn't used much during the Battle of Britain). For troops defending a strong point, a Ju87 attack was truly a terrifying experience.

The German air ministry had declared that all German bombers must be capable of dive bombing. This was because dive bombing was so much more accurate than level bombing and Germany was critically short of munitions.

In the Ju87, Junkers developed a dive-bomber that was un-matched by anything else in the world. With its strengthened airframe and attack dive autopilot system, it could maintain control whilst accurately diving at 90 degrees onto its target at a constant speed of over 300mph.

Here's an insight into the procedures the pilot went through during his attack dive:


The pilot approaches his target at between 13,000 and 15,000 feet and locates his target through a bombsight window in the cockpit floor.

He sets the chosen altitude for bomb release and pullout into the autopilot system (usually at a minimum height of 1,500 feet) .

He moves the dive lever to the rear, limiting the "throw" of the control column.

He opens the dive brakes,  sets the trim tabs, retards his throttle and closes the coolant flaps.

The aircraft rolls 180 degrees onto its back and then noses into a dive.

Red tabs protrude from the upper surfaces of the wing as a visual indicator to the pilot that, in case of a g-induced black-out, the automatic dive recovery system would be activated.

The Stuka dived at an angle between 60-90 degrees, holding a constant speed due to dive brake deployment which increases the accuracy of the Ju87's aim.

The pilot would manually fine-tune the dive angle (often 90 degrees) by reference to the visual horizon out the side of his canopy.

At about four seconds before the release altitude is reached, a horn in the cockpit would sounds. When the horn stops, a light on the contact altimeter comes on, the pilot releases the bomb and initiates the automatic pull-out mechanism by depressing a knob on the control column.

An elongated U-shaped crutch located under the fuselage swings the bomb out of the way of the propeller and the aircraft automatically begins its 6g pullout causing the crew's sight to grey out. Once the nose was above the horizon, the dive brakes retract, the throttle opens and the propeller is set to climb.

The pilot regains control and resumes normal flight.

He must reopen his coolant flaps quickly to prevent his engine from overheating.

With the target area now behind the aircraft, the rear gunner would spray the area with machine gun fire, keeping the defenders' heads down to help ensure the success of the next Stuka dive bomber in line.

The automatic pull-out was not liked by all pilots. Helmut Mahlke said that on his unit they disconnected the system because it allowed the enemy to predict the Ju87's recovery pattern and height, making it easier for ground defences to hit an aircraft.

Ungainly? Yes! 

Vulnerable to attacks but fast Spitfires and Hurricanes? Yes!

...but as an accurate and terrifying bombing system it was unmatched. 

In the Ju87 Stuka dive bomber, the German army must surely have had the most effective artillery in the world.

Perfect for the prosecution of a lightning war, or Blitzkrieg!

by Steve Dunster

The New Tactics that Devastated Convoy CW.8 on 25 July 1940

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On 25 July 1940 the Luftwaffe took advantage of improved weather to attack a twenty-one ship convoy as it made its way through the Straits of Dover but they did so with devastatingly effective new tactics.

Of the 21 ships in the convoy only 10 reached their destination of Portland, 11 ships were sunk or seriously disabled during the attack. Two Royal Naval destroyers sent to help were also put out of action and had to be towed back to Dover.

This was the first time that Germany attacked a convoy from land, sea and air. They fired on the convoy with its big guns around Cap Gris Nez, they attacked it using high-speed German naval S-boats and bombed it from the air using wave after wave of Ju87 Stuka dive-bombers. The effect was devastating and the attack lasted from 11:30am to 7:30pm.

In the morning Convoy CW.8 (Convoy Westward) was attacked by a wave of Ju87s, 50 Bf109s, fast S-boats and was fired upon from the French shore.

The escorting Bf109s came in at sea level to be met by Spitfires of 65 Squadron (Hornchurch) while the Ju87s came out of the sky to dive bomb the convoy.

No 32 Squadron Hurricanes (Biggin Hill) and 615 Squadron Hurricanes (Kenley) came to assist the sea level dogfight with the fifty Bf109s.

No 54 Squadron Spitfires (Rochford) answered the call for assistance from the escorting naval vessels and engaged Bf109s that had arrived to assist the Ju87s. No 54 Squadron was to suffer badly but with one Spitfire to every five Bf109s it was a wonder that they only lost three aircraft.

Further waves of attacking aircraft continued through out the afternoon.

The Royal Naval destroyers Boreas and Brilliant were sent out from Dover to repulse the German motor torpedo boats attacking the convoy. Pursuing the S-boats away from the convoy and towards Calais, the destroyers were attacked themselves by German bombers.

Ju87s badly damaged Boreas with two hits on her bridge, 17 crew were killed and 5 died of their wounds.

Brilliant was also bombed, receiving two hits in the stern. Her tiller flat was flooded and boiler room fan support cracked but there were no casualties.

Both destroyers were towed back into Dover by tugs. Brilliant's repairs wouldn't be completed until September 1940 and Boreas wasn't repaired until January 1941.

25 July 1940 was undoubtedly a bad day for the RAF, the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy.

The losses were so great that it was decided to only move convoys through the English Channel after darkness and the Admiralty moved their RN ships out of Dover and put them in the relative safety of Portsmouth. Merchant ships would take on gunners in order to offer some defence and escorts would be provided in the future.

The day undoubtedly belonged to Germany and its effective new tactics but Britain was learning and adapting - a pattern that would repeat itself many times throughout the Summer.

by Steve Dunster

Boulton-Paul Defiant: Stupid Idea or Dreadful Leadership?

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The Boulton-Paul Defiant has been the subject of much discussion on the @BofB1940 twitter feed. Most have the view that the aircraft is a flawed concept, an idea that couldn't possibly have worked, an idea that needlessly cost lives.

A small minority on the @BofB1940 feed have defended the aircraft saying that it was Fighter Command's mis-use of the aircraft that was flawed, not the design concept. 

Slaughter of the Innocents

On the 19th July 1940, No 141 Squadron (Defiants) sent up nine aircraft (together with a Spitfire squadron and a Hurricane squadron) to intercept Bf110s that were reportedly dive bombing shipping off Dover. 

Whilst they were still climbing, a group of Bf109s were sweeping high above the English Channel with perfect visibility. Undetected by the climbing Defiants, the Bf109s performed the perfect bounce and attacked from the sun.

The brief but brutal combat resulted in the loss of six out of the nine Defiants and signalled the end of the RAF using them as daytime front-line fighters. No 141 Squadron was withdrawn to 13 Group and the Defiant was eventually relegated to that of a night fighter role.

Stupid Idea?

Many people (like me) think that a fighter the size of a Spitfire with a less powerful engine, with the extra weight of a second crew member and a one ton turret is a really stupid idea.

If you then take that stupid idea and make sure that the pilot has no forward firing armaments and that the turret can only fire upwards and that the gunner has to constantly tell the pilot what he's trying to shoot at - then this must surely be the most monumentally stupid idea of all human conflict?

Such people (like me) can't understand why on earth the Boulton-Paul Defiant could possibly have been deployed into 11 Group as a day time front line fighter in Hell Fire Corner. We assumed that this "stupid idea" must have seemed a "good idea" a long time before the War, like the Blenheim, but by the time war broke out, it was out-dated. If that's true, what was it doing in Hell Fire Corner?

The Defiant at its Best

It turns out that the Boulton-Paul Defiant was actually the newest fighter in the RAF which would explain why it was used in front-line day time duties in Fighter Command.

Sadly the Defiant wasn't designed as a fighter to take on single seat fighters, it was designed as a Bomber Destroyer to kill unescorted bombers.

During the Winter of 1940, No 264 Squadron was equipped with the first ever Defiants. They developed new tactics for the new type. 

No 264 Squadron was Operational in March 1940 and was highly successful in the Battle for France.

A properly trained Defiant squadron, it would seem, can be highly successful at destroying Ju87s, He111s and Ju88s. A valuable asset indeed for the Battle of Britain

No 264 Squadron (Defiants) had 64 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed for a loss of 14 Defiants.

141 Squadron had its Own Ideas

No 141 Squadron was the second squadron to be equipped with Defiants but decided they would take little notice of the tactics developed by the highly successful 264 Squadron before it.

When 141 Squadron was thrown into the heat of battle on 19 July 1940, it had none of the well trained, well thought through, tried and battle-tested tactics of 264 Squadron.

Defiants couldn't Speak to Spitfire or Hurricane Squadrons

One of the shortcomings of the Defiant (as highlighted by 264 Squadron but not fixed by Fighter Command) was that the Defiants were fitted with a different radio system to that of the rest of Fighter Command.

When No 141 Squadron was sent up to engage the enemy on 19 July 1940 with a Spitfire squadron and a Hurricane squadron, they had no method of communicating with them.

The Defiant was an Unescorted Bomber Destroyer

...so why on earth was 141 Squadron ever deployed to 11 Group. It was possibly the only Group in Fighter Command that was likely to have fighter escorted bombers almost all the time because it was so close to enemy airfields in France.

No 141 Squadron would presumably have been far better deployed to 13 Group in Scotland or the East Coast.

Stupid Idea or Dreadful Leadership?

Whilst I have always been of the view that the Boulton-Paul Defiant was a stupid idea, I had been ignorant of the tactics developed for it in 264 Squadron and how amazingly successful they had been in France.

I was also unaware that it's concept was one of the Unescorted Bomber Destroyer, for which (looking at 264's statistics) it would seem to have been remarkably well suited.

This does leave me with these three burning questions:

1. Why was No 141 Squadron leadership allowed to completely ignore battle-proven tactics as developed by No 264 Squadron and to go into battle on 19 July 1940 un-prepared?
2. Why was No 141 Squadron not deployed to a Group in Fighter Command where it was more likely to come across "unescorted bombers", like Scotland or the East Coast?
3. Why was the interoperability issue not addressed regarding the different radio systems used on Defiants?

For me, thanks to No 264 Squadron, I no longer consider the Defiant a stupid idea. 

It doesn't sound like a flawed concept but a niche and specialist role.

I have to say that I'm a convert. I now agree with the small minority on the @BofB1940 feed who say it wasn't the Defiant that was the problem, it was the leadership...the leadership of No 141 Squadron and the leadership of Fighter Command.

Churchill wanted Defiants but Dowding wanted Spitfires & Hurricanes

Churchill supported the concept of the Defiant but Dowding wanted fast single-seater forward-firing fighters.

Dowding only equipped two of his squadrons with Defiants and when one of them suffered heavy losses it gave him the ideal reason to withdraw Defiants from his front line.

Was it Dowding's lack of enthusiasm for the Defiant that created the conditions which led to a series of leadership failures that resulted in No 141 Squadron suffering such heavy losses?

Churchill later felt that he'd been wrong to support the Defiant...but maybe he hadn't been, maybe he'd been ignorant of the leadership failings surrounding No 141...he might even have been ignorant of the incredible successes of No 264 Squadron.

Why was No 264 Squadron Withdrawn from Operations?

By May 1940, the successful No 264 Squadron started to suffer mounting losses as the Luftwaffe discovered the Defiant was vulnerable to frontal attack. 264 was withdrawn from operations as a day fighter and started to train for the night fighter role.

Nevertheless, had Defiant squadrons been restricted to that of Unescorted Bomber Destroyer,  maybe 264 would have faired better.

Maybe it was right that the Defiants were withdrawn but maybe there was also an element of self-fulfillment about Dowding's prophecy.

Should the Defiant have been Withdrawn?

Is it possible that if enough Defiant squadrons had followed the battle-proven tactics and training of 264 

...and if Fighter Command and ensured that all Defiants could have communicated properly with their protecting Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons 

...and if Fighter Command had ensured that Defiants were largely engaging with unescorted bombers by deploying them into Scotland and the East Coast and freeing up single seat fighters for 11 Group,

...is it possible that the RAF's newest fighter, the Defiant, could have come out of the Battle of Britain with high scores and low losses

...and when we said the words Spitfire and Hurricane with patriotic pride, perhaps we might also have said Boulton-Paul Defiant.

by Steve Dunster