During the Summer of 1940, Germany came perilously close to winning the Battle of Britain by destroying RAF Fighter Command over Southern England and allowing Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of England, to begin.
During the Spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe had been highly successful in the tactical close-air-support role of Germany's Blitzkrieg (lightning war) across Europe but it was it's strategic bombing role in the Blitz (bombing of British cities) from September 1940 onwards, that lost Germany the air war over England.
Germany's pre-war thinking was very much that the Luftwaffe's primary role was as tactical close air support for the army. This proved most successful in Poland, Belgium and France.
Ironically, if the Luftwaffe had remained in the tactical role of destroying Fighter Command airfields, it may well have won the Battle of Britain - it was only when it turned to strategic attacks on cities (for which the Luftwaffe had not designed) that the Battle started to turn in Britain's favour.
Tactical Good - Strategic Bad!
Between the wars, the German military were working on the assumption that the prospects of peace in Europe after 1940 were doubtful. The Luftwaffe was therefore instructed to prepare for war with a target date of 1943.
Germany's first consideration was for land wars with its European neighbours which led it to the conclusion that the Luftwaffe's primary role was to support the army.
Dive Bombers Good - Level Bombers Bad
Severe shortages in munitions led it to an almost obsessive preference of dive-bombing over level bombing. Dive bombing was very much more accurate, which would considered or critical importance due to the desperate shortage of munitions available to Germany.
The demand for bombs would be so great during the Polish campaign that for a while concrete bombs filled with shrapnel were produced to cover shortages.
Medium Bombers Good - Heavy Bombers Bad
The severe shortages in petroleum products meant it could not run a heavy bomber force for strategic bombing. The proportion of resources that a heavy bomber capability would take from the Luftwaffe's petroleum products budget was considered to be much too big for the small benefit they thought they might get from it.
Another reason a heavy bomber force was never developed was the lack of suitable engines to power a heavy bomber. This was partly due to the late start that German engineers had in designing high-performance engine types and partly due to the low octane fuels available to operate them.
Germany entered the war using 87-89 octane fuels. In contrast, during the Battle of Britain, the British were using 100 octane rules supplied by the United States.
German industry had designed some successful heavy bombers but the Luftwaffe would never get to use them.
Development of German Bomber Types
Between the wars, Germany was rapidly building an air force and designing the aircraft that it should comprise of. From concept to production of a new aircraft type, it could take the best part of five years. This allowed for only two or three generations of aircraft before their target date of being ready for war by 1943. Between 1919 and 1929 the speed, range and bomb load of a typical bomber had more than doubled.
In 1934 a medium bomber specification was issues and the Dornier Do17 and the Heinkel He111 were selected for further development but these would continue to have shortcomings which led to the development of the Junkers Ju88 "fast bomber".
The original Ju88 had very impressive performance which was the spoilt by the German authority's insistence on it being modified to have a dive-bombing capability.
"A War Against England is Quite Out of the Question"
Hitler told Georing in the Summer of 1938 that:
"a war against England is quite out of the question!"
[The Luftwaffe War Diaries, Bekker 1968]
It is this, together with shortages of munitions and petroleum products that sealed the fete of Germany's expensive heavy bombers. Emphasis would instead be put into larger numbers of the fast, light, twin-engined medium bombers which were accurate and ideal for close air support of land forces.
Hitler hadn't expected a war with England and the Luftwaffe hadn't prepared for it. But had Germany produced a heavy bomber capability in time for use against England's cities as well as its airfields, the levels of destruction, and even the very outcome of the Battle of Britain itself, could well have been different.
by Steve Dunster
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