Thursday, 6 August 2015

The Destruction of Fighter Command - in 4 Days?


Hitler's Directive for the Conduct of War Against England

On 1 August 1940 Hitler issued his Directive No 17, For the Conduct of Air and Naval Warfare Against England. In summary it said:

  • Employ all forces available to eliminate the British air force as soon as possible
  • Once temporary or local air superiority is achieved, operations will continue against ports
  • Air operations against hostile naval and merchant ships will be considered a secondary mission
  • The intensified air offensive will be conducted so that adequately strong air forces can be made available whenever required to support naval operations against favourable fleeting targets

Eagle Attack

On 2 August 1940 the Luftwaffe General Staff issued the plan for the destruction of the RAF, starting the campaign for the Battle of Britain. Their plan for Adlerangrif or "Eagle Attack" consisted of three phases:

Phase One

First 5 days: attacks made a semicircle starting in the west and proceeding south and then east, within a 90 to 60 mile radius of London

Phase Two

Next 3 days: radius from London reduced to between 60 and 30 miles

Phase Three

Final 5 days: attacks concentrated within a 30 mile radius centred on London


In addition to the task of defeating the RAF, the German Combined Staffs had issued a directive in July from Field Marshal Keitel stipulating:

"The German lack of command of the sea could be substituted by supremacy in the air"

It was recognised that permanent air supremacy was impossible without the occupation by land forces because many of the British air bases and supporting factories were beyond the range that Luftwaffe bombers could operate with fighter escorts. But it was thought that temporary air supremacy over the invasion area would be possible. This was considered sufficient to allow Operation Sea Lion (the invasion of England) to proceed as planned.

The Luftwaffe were confident in their believe that they could achieve:

"The destruction of RAF Fighter Command in the south, would take four days"

Not all of the Luftwaffe leadership was the General Staff that Alderangrif was the correct approach. The two Luftlotten commanders, Sperrle and Kesselring, both felt that RAF Fighter Command should be decisively weakened through night attacks before beginning any significant daylight operations.

These views were over-ruled by Goering who believed that Fighter Command had already been substantially weakened. Goering was slowly beginning to take more and more control of Luftwaffe operations.

PHASE ONE of Eagle Attack

On 6 August 1940 Goering set 10 August as the start date for Eagle Attack but bad weather postponed it until 13 August. On the 13th marginal weather resulted in the cancellation of some missions and sporadic  results from others. Instead of focussing on Fighter Command, target types were many and varied, including: Bomber Command airfields, Fighter Command airfields, Coastal Command stations, channel shipping, aircraft factories and at least nine manufacturing cities.

There was little other objective other than to "test the British defences."

Throughout Phase One, through to the 18 August, attacks were directed against Fighter Command but generally only limited damage was inflicted with most facilities back in service within hours.

Despite having the objective to reduce the effectiveness of Fighter Command, only limited effort was directed against Fighter Command bases, facilities and command and control capabilities.

Goering's Reorganisation after Phase One

The Luftwaffe believed it was sufficient to draw up the British fighters to kill them in the air and a German intelligence report on the 18 August suggested that it was working:

"Estimated that the British had lost 770 fighters in the period from 1st July to 16th August and that only 300 were still operational"

In reality 214 British fighters had been destroyed, 71 damaged in combat and more than 600 were still operational.

At the end of Phase One, Goering decided to withdraw Ju87s from the Battle because of their excessive losses and he needed to conserve them for support of invasion forces. Bf110s had suffered similarly high losses but Goering refused to withdraw them, instead he directed Bf109s to escort them as well as bombers.

Despite the Bf109s accounting for the majority of RAF kills, Goering would persistently blame the Bf109 pilots for lack of aggression and this led to some senior fighter unit commanders being replaced.

Goering also decided there was little value to making any further attacks of British radar installations.

PHASE TWO of Eagle Attack

Phase Two did not immediately follow the first phase because of reorganisation or additional fighter forces in the Pas de Calais and because of bad weather. After a five day delay the offensive resumed on 24 August. The Luftwaffe concentrated its attacks on Manston, Hornchurch and North Weald.

New tactics were used by both sides. The Luftwaffe used fewer bombers and more fighters in their formations because of the continued reluctance of the British to do battle with the German fighters. Park had ordered his pilots to accept combat with German fighters only if Fighter Command sector airfields were threatened.

For the duration of Phase Two, 24 August to 6 September, the RAF lost 273 fighters in combat plus 49 damaged. The Luftwaffe lost 308 fighters and bombers with 62 damaged.

Six out of seven sector airfields were extensively damaged and the telecommunications links to and from the operations blocks had proved especially vulnerable.

The German strategy of concentrating on attacking Fighter Command airfields was working, it was forcing the RAF fighters into combat. The higher concentration of fighters in German raids reduced the edge that Fighter Command had previously had.

The Luftwaffe could afford to trade Bf109s one for one with Spitfires and Hurricanes.

Fighter Command was Facing Destruction by the end of Phase Two

According to Dowding, "The rate of loss was so heavy that fresh squadrons became worn out before convalescing squadrons were ready to take their place."

Dwindling Reserves

Between 8 August and 6 September, 657 British fighters had been lost. By using replacement aircraft from repairs and storage, Fighter Command had managed to keep frontline strength to about the same levels as were available at the end of July - until 1 September.

Reserves had dwindled from 518 Spitfires and Hurricanes on 6 July to only 292 by 7 September.

Disappointing Production

In the last week of August, only 91 Spitfires and Hurricanes were produced while losses reached 137 destroyed and 11 seriously damaged.

On the Verge of Destruction

Fighter Command estimated that reserves would be exhausted in three weeks followed by the steady depletion of frontline squadrons. This would be accelerated if the Luftwaffe could successfully know out critical production facilities.

Critical Shortage of Pilots

In Phase One of the campaign (8 to 18 August) the RAF lost 154 pilots (killed, seriously wounded or missing) but only 63 new fighter pilots had come through from the training schools.

During August the combat strength of Fighter Command fell by almost a third from 1,434 to 1,023. The squadron average fell from 26 to 16 operational pilots.

In July and August, roughly a quarter of the squadron leaders and a third of the flight leaders had been killed or removed from flying due to injuries.

Experienced pilots made up less than half of Fighter Command's strength, the remainder having less than 20 hours flying time on fighters.

Stress levels were high and it was not uncommon for pilots to fly three or four sorties a day.

Eagle Attack Nearly Worked

The RAF was faced with the real possibility of withdrawing the depleted and exhausted 11 Group to bases north of London.

Goering's Eagle Attack was close to success. The Luftwaffe had within its grasp the possibility of achieving air superiority over the landing grounds of Operation Sea Lion, the German invasion of England.

Luftwaffe's Change in Strategy

From the Luftwaffe's point of view, losses were very heavy and they had failed to tempt the RAF up in sufficient numbers to allow the German fighters to deliver the decisive blow.

The idea of attacking London was gaining traction by the end of August.

The German High Command had set 15 September as the original date for the invasion but by the beginning of September it was delayed until 21 September because the Luftwaffe had not neutralised the threat from the British Navy and RAF to the invasion forces.

On 3 September Goering told Kesselring and Sperrle that there was no chance of destroying the English fighters on the ground and the RAF's last reserves would have to be forced into the air.

His idea was that if the British were heavily defending their airfields, then they would defend even more vigorously their capital. Since London was within the range of the Bf109, the Luftwaffe could more easily concentrate their fighter forces for the kill.

Sperrle strongly disagreed with Goering's plan to attack London. He felt that the British forces were too strong and that they too could concentrate all the their fighters over London. He favoured continued attacks on the airfields.

German intelligence reports suggested that British aircraft serviceability was as low as 100 at the end of August. In fact the operational strength stood at 672 on 23 August.

Hitler had forbidden attacks on London but the British had launched several attacks on Berlin in response to an accidental bombing of parts of London on 24 August. Fearing for his own popularity, Hitler agreed on 31 August to reprisal attacks on London.

PHASE THREE of Eagle Attack

On 7 September, Phase Three started with 650 bombers and over 1,000 attacking London docks by day. Substantial damage was inflicted on London but Fighter Command, from 7 September onwards, had been saved from defeat on the ground. However, it was still possible that the RAF could be defeated in the air above London.

From 11 to 14 September, London was attack by two major attacks (200+ bombers) and two minor attacks by day as well as attacks every night. Additional day raids were also carried out on Southampton (twice), Portland, Brighton, Eastbourne, Canterbury, Great Yarmouth and Norwich presumably to soften up the defences of these cities in preparation for invasion. But instead, the Luftwaffe would almost certainly have been better targeting 11 Group airfields.

Luftwaffe bombers losses were high and the bomber commanders were successful in getting Goering to order that the first role of the German fighters was to protect the bombers and not attack the enemy, but his stated objective was to draw up fighters so they could be destroyed. The whole purpose of attacking London in the first place would seem to have been lost.

The respite experienced by RAF airfields allowed the first break in over ten days for the pilots of 11 Group. Fighter Command had been in a state of near exhaustion but a new vigour resulted and was to prove decisive in the air battles on 15 September, they day that is now celebrated as Battle of Britain Day.

The Decisive Day - 15 September 1940

The Luftwaffe High Command fully expected the missions scheduled for 15 September to be the decisive blow. From Hitler down, the German leadership believed that Fighter Command had been broken in spirit and material. RAF resistance to attacks on 11 and 14 September had been slight (owing to errors in coordinating intercepts).

Attacks against London on 15 September involved 300 bombers and 1,000 fighters with another raid  of 30 against Portland and Southampton aircraft works.

With the support of 12 Group, Fighter Command met the raid with 170 Spitfires and Hurricanes operating from bases close to London which were not under attack.

Fighter Command downed 58 and damaged 25 German aircraft including 26 fighters lost and 8 damaged. Psychologically, the blow to the Luftwaffe was devastating.

British superiority on the 15 September was most likely to have benefited from the proximity of their airfields to the Battle, the freshness of the crews, the fact the airfields had not been attacked for the two days previous and the fact there was no diversionary raid.

German attacks continue in attempts to wear down the enemy but none with the strength launched on the 15 September.

Despite their continuing attacks, the Luftwaffe saw no evidence that the RAF was getting weaker but was suffering terrible losses.

Eventually raids would be restricted to the hours of darkness and Operation Sea Lion was indefinitely postponed. In the Spring of 1941, Hitler turned his attentions towards Russia and the Luftwaffe units that had been bombing England were re-deployed to the Eastern Front.

Britain can be grateful to more than just Churchill's Few

Fighter Command, particularly Dowding and Park but also all the pilots and ground crew, had played their part well and were well deserved recipients of the "gratitude of every home in our Island."

But Britain should also be grateful to some of those "in the abodes of the guilty" (as Churchill described the Germans):

had they attacked airfields by night prior to attacking them by day, 
had they attacked the airfields for longer, 
had they continued to attack Britain's radar installations, 
had Goering allowed his fighters to engage the British fighters instead of protecting his bombers, 
had Goering continued to attack airfields whilst he attacked London

had Hitler followed his instinct and prevented attacks on London 
and focussed on air-supremacy over his landing grounds

then the Luftwaffe may have won the Battle of Britain and Hitler may have invaded England.

by Steve Dunster

Sunday, 2 August 2015

British Radar: It's not what you've got - it's what you do with it!


British radar has widely been credited as being a major reason for the RAF being able prevent the Luftwaffe from gaining air superiority over the UK during the Battle of Britain.

British radar could determine the distance and height of aircraft approaching the coast from 200 miles away and could even detect low flying aircraft from a distance of 100 miles away.

This allowed RAF Controllers to have sufficient early warning to be able to scramble fighters and direct (vector) them to intercept raids without having to fly standing patrols, giving exhausted pilots much needed respite at the height of the battle.

It is thought that the effectiveness of British radar largely neutralised the advantage that Germany should of had from its superiority in numbers making the Battle much more closely matched. Without radar the RAF would probably have been overwhelmed by the Luftwaffe and the Battle of Britain may well have been lost. 

Why didn't the Luftwaffe knock out the British radar stations? 

It wasn't because radar was a military secret or because Germany couldn't work out what the strange masts were for. They knew exactly what they were and what they were capable of.

Germany actually had much better radar than Britain during the Battle of Britain. Their radar sets were smaller; easier to rotate, move and position; higher resolution and able to detect smaller targets.

Whilst their Freya radar sets were better, they were of a more complex design and they only had 8 operational by the start of the war, leaving large gaps between covered areas.

British radar was simpler and easier to make and by the start of the war there was a complete chain of radar stations looking out to sea all along the southern and eastern coasts (Chain Home or CH).

Germany was successfully detecting RAF bomber raids in great detail with their radar but they were having big problems communicating any useful information in time to their intercepting fighters. They therefore assumed that the RAF would have the same problem so didn't see British radar as a high priority target.

Curiously, whilst Germany was having problems getting radar data to fighters, they did seem to have some success in vectoring bombers onto shipping targets they'd detecting some 60 miles away.

At the start of the Battle of Britain, Germany did try to attack British radar using two different methods: dive-bombing and jamming.

Dive-bombing met with little success, primarily because the huge masts of open steel construction were quite resilient to bomb damage. A few of the radar stations were taken off line temporarily but only for few hours. It is perhaps worth considering what might have happened if Germany had realised their importance and been more persistent in their raids.

Jamming only met with temporary success. In July 1940 a simple method of jamming was used by Germany but was easily defeated. In September 1940 a more elaborate method of jamming was used but this too was quickly defeated.

The Dowding System

What was exceptional about the British radar, was not the radar itself but the command and control method developed before the war by Dowding and his commanders.

British radar could only look out to sea, once the raid was over land, the radar was no help and plotting raids over land had to be done with the help of the Observer Corps.

The UK was divided up into small areas, each with it's own designation and there would be an Observer Corps detachment responsible for each. Each detachment would be connected by telephone to the same filter rooms as the radar stations allowing a battle plan be updated,almost in real time so the commanders could decide how to respond.

The UK had solved the problem of getting useful radar data to the intercepting fighters!

It also had radar stations that were resilient to bombing, a design that was simple and quick to construct, a radar coverage that was complete with no holes, a backup system with the Observer Corps and a radar design that was capable of being quickly modified to counter jamming.

Britain didn't have the best radar - but it did know what to do with it!

by Steve Dunster




Friday, 31 July 2015

Understanding Luftwaffe Unit Designations


To the untrained eye, the composition of the Luftwaffe can seem complex and hard to grasp. With designations such as StabII/StG2 and 3/JG27, it's easy to get befuddled, but once you get into the logic behind these names, it's really not that confusing.

At the time of the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe was split into 7 Luftflotten (Air Fleets). Luftflotten were created according to a geographical area, and as new territories were invaded, new Luftflotten were created.

Although Luftflotten could be moved to a new area, whilst in one place that Luftflotte had absolute control over all aspects of aviation in the region, including ground operations.

Each Luftflotte was also allocated 25 Geschwader (Wings). Luftflotte 1 would have Wings 1-25, Luftflotte 2 would have 26-50 etc.

Each Lutflotte was then divided into one of more Fliegerkorps (Air Corps), depending on the size and manner of the operations being undertaken. At the time of the Battle of Britain, 13 Fliegerkorps were in operation.

Similar to Luftflotten, the Fliegerkorps had their own areas of operations, and were responsible for all operational matters such as maintenance, ordnance and deployment. However, they depended on the parent Luftflotte for administration and supply purposes.

Each Fliegerkorps consists of several Geschwader (Wings) along with Reconnaissance Gruppen (Groups).

Geschwader are specialised to a certain operational duty, be it a fighter wing or a bomber wing. The others include dive-bombers, night fighters, gliders, transport and ground attack wings.

The designations of the different Geschwader are as follows:

Fighter Wing --- Jagdgeschwader (JG)
Night Fighter Wing --- Nachtjagdgeschwader (NJG)
Heavy Fighter Wing --- Zerstörergeschwader (ZG)
Bomber Wing --- Kampfgeschwader (KG)
Dive-Bomber Wing --- Sturzkampfgeschwader (StG)
Fast Bomber Wing --- Schnellkampfgeschwader (SKG)
Transport Wing --- Transportgeschwader (TG)
Ground Attack Wing --- Schlactgeschwader (SchlG)
Glider Wing --- Luftlandgeschwader (LLG)
Advanced Training Wing --- Lehrgeschwader (LG)

As there were more than one of each type of Wing, an Arabic numeral would be placed after the abbreviation to distinguish between them. For example,  the 27th Jagdgeschwader would be written as JG27

Each different Geschwader is then divided into 3 Gruppen (Groups), although sometimes a 4th or even a 5th were added to bolster the strength of the Geschwader.

The Gruppen within each Geschwader were ordered consecutiveley with Roman numerals. Therefore, the 4th group of the 27th Jagdgeschwader would be written as IV/JG27.

Each Gruppen then contained 3 or 4 Staffeln (Squadrons). The Staffeln were numbered consecutively in Arabic numerals within their Geschwader, regardless of the Gruppe they belonged to. For example,  the Staffeln of Gruppe I would be numbered 1, 2 and 3, but the Staffeln of Gruppe II would be numbered 4, 5 and 6.

The designations of Staffeln were similar to that of the Gruppen, but with Arabic numerals instead of Roman ones. The 3rd Staffel of Gruppe II of Jagdgeschwader 27 would be written as 6/JG27. Note that it's a 6 instead of a 3, as it's a part of the 2nd Gruppe.

Sometimes, designations will be written like StabJG27, or StabIV/JG27. The 'Stab' means 'Staff', and shows that that flight consists of aircrew and aircraft from the HQ staff, normally involving the Group/Wing Leader.

Each Group and Wing contains a single Staff flight (StabSchwarm) consisting of 4 aircraft (including the Group/Wing Leader).

A single Staffel contains on average 12 planes, although this can vary from 5 or 6 up to 16, depending on losses and reinforcements.

In a Fighter Wing, each Staffel is divided into 3 Schwarms (Flights) of 4 aircraft each. A Fighter Schwarm was then divided into 2 Rotten (Singular - Rotte, literally meaning 'Gang') of 2 aircraft each. A Rotte was the basic fighting unit, consisting of a Leader and a Wingman.

In a Bomber Wing, however, the Staffel is divided into 2 Schwarms of 6 aircraft each. Each Schwarm was then split into 2 Ketten (Singular - Kette, meaning 'Chain') of 3 aircraft each. The Kette was the standard bomber formation, and consisted of the 3 planes forming a V-shaped formation.

Examples:

9/KG76 --- 9th Squadron of the 76th Bomber Wing

3/StG77 --- 3rd Squadron of the 77th Dive-Bomber Wing

III/JG53 --- 3rd Group of the 53rd Fighter Wing

StabIII/KG2 --- Staff Flight of the 3rd Group of the 2nd Bomber Wing

So, just to recap, on average there are 12 aircraft in a Staffel, 3-5 Staffeln in a Gruppe, 3-5 Gruppen in a Geschwader, 25 Geschwader in a Luftflotte (spread out between several Fliegerkorps), and 7 Luftflotten in the entire Luftwaffe.

I hope this helps

by Kit Dunster

What was the Battle of Britain? ...and who were The Few?


The American journalist Ralph Ingersoll thought that:

The Battle of Britain was important in history as Waterloo or Gettysburg


What was the Battle of Britain?

...maybe the answer depends on who you ask!

Answer 1: No Idea!

According to the results of a survey carried out by the RAF Benevolent Fund for the 75th Anniversary of the Battle of Britain (published by The Telegraph on 10 July 2015), of 1,000 people asked:

40% of today's young people have no idea of what the Battle of Britain is
Only half of all adults knew that The Few is a reference to those who fought in the Battle of Britain
One in ten 18-24 year olds thought the Battle of Britain took place last year
The same number thought the Battle of Britain referred to a Viking attack

Answer 2: Spitfires and Dashing Pilots

Spitfires look fantastic nowadays, they must have looked even more so during the 1940s when the previous frontline fighters were bi-planes. Some of the pilots were young, rich, well educated, drove fast sports cars and looked very dashing.

At a time when public morale was everything and large numbers of RAF aircraft were flying over the Home Counties, it would have made great sense to have publicised these dashing pilots on posters and in films.

In actuality, pilots came from all backgrounds and all parts of the Empire and a great number of them were not even officers.

Whilst the Spitfire is still one of the prettiest aircraft ever made, there were actually more Hurricanes than Spitfires during the Battle of Britain and they shot down more enemy aircraft.


Answer 3: The Greatest Air Battle Ever Fought

Germany had some 2,500 aircraft ranged against the UK. The RAF had some 600+ fighters. There was no doubt that the people who witnessed the Battle of Britain must have been in awe of the numbers involved.

The noise, the destructive power, the sight of hundreds of aircraft, wave after wave...something that may never be seen again.

Answer 4: When Britain Fought Alone against the Might of an Undefeated Nazi Germany

As "under-dog" stories go, the Battle of Britain has surely got to be up there with the best. Germany was huge and its industrial might was immense. Then after the fall of France, Germany had most of Continental Europe under its command.

Since the fall of France, Germany could launch air attacks and an invasion from anywhere along the East Coast but also anywhere along our South Coast too.

The Luftwaffe had more aircraft than the RAF, it had more experience, better tactics and arguably better equipment.

Answer 5: When Britain Turned the Tide of the War Against Germany

When war was declared on 3 September 1939, fear and anxiety seared through every family in the Realm.

The hideous violence of the Great War (as it was known then, only later to be known as the First World War), the War to End All Wars, was still fresh in living memory.

So many families had lost fathers, brothers and sons - gassed, machine-gunned, blow apart or drowned. Many of those that survived had missing limbs and many more had psychological damage. Almost every family had been affected or knew one that was.

It is these memories and images that went through the minds of families when they heard Neville Chamberlain declare war on the radio 3 September 1939.

Terrible though the First World War was, the next war was feared to be even worse. Air warfare technology had transformed. Modern aircraft could go higher, faster, further and carry bomb loads of unspeakable destructive power.

There was a feeling that "the bomber would always get through" and that they would not just drop high explosives but incendiaries and, the most feared of all, gas!

The entire population was issued with gas masks. It was an offence to be in public without carrying your gas mask.

By July 1940, UK families had lost 100,000 of their fathers, brothers and sons in the fall of France. Another 200,000 had only just made it home by the skin of their teeth and with the determination of the Royal Navy and it's fleet of Little Ships. They had lost their children, sent to the countryside to avoid the horrors of aerial bombing. The sea shores were off limits and covered in minefields and barbed wire. Local recreation grounds were now the homes of barrage balloons, search lights and anti-aircraft guns. Long cherished gardens had been dug up to plant vegetables and bury bomb shelters. Almost everybody, it seemed, was wearing military uniform or had become part of the war effort in civilian life as air raid wardens, fire watchers, working on farms or in factories or in hospitals or raising money.

The whole of Continental Europe had fallen to Nazi Germany in weeks. Two of the greatest armies in the world (of France and Britain) had been brushed aside with heavy losses. German forces were only a few short miles across the Channel. To the entire world, it seemed that England was next.

Refugees from Belgium and Occupied Europe had made it across the Channel with horrific stories of torture and summary executions. There could be little doubt in the minds of the ordinary British public that if Germany succeeded in invading the UK that political elites, academics, engineers and anybody in a leadership position would be imprisoned, deported or executed.

Can it be any wonder that when the new Prime Minister Winston Churchill with his rousing speeches in June about never surrendering that it captured the hearts and minds of the entire population.

The Home Fleet of the Royal Navy were given the job of destroying any invasion fleet that headed for UK shores. The Royal Navy was a formidable fighting force and one that is widely thought to have been our saviour should Hitler have actually attempted an invasion... but they were far out to sea and away from the public gaze.

The Royal Air Force on the other hand were flying frequently over homes, factories and farms going out to meet the enemy. With the roar of their Merlin engines and disciplined formations they must have been an exciting and encouraging sight for the desperate eyes of a frightened public.

The public could see swirling vapour trails as "our boys" engaged the enemy. Sometimes they'd see enemy aircraft shot down or even crash-land close by. It was a visible and tangible sight that gave weight to Churchill's assertion that: "we will never surrender."

I don't think Churchill can have over-stated it when he said that:

"....the gratitude of every home in our Island...goes out to the airmen who...are turning the tide of the war."

The reality is that the British Army and Royal Navy were every bit as involved in the prevention of the much feared invasion as the Royal Air Force was...but the RAF were always present, above the homes of the anxious...and they were winning...despite being dreadfully out-numbered and suffering dreadful losses.

...and for that, every home in the Island I am sure would have been immeasurably grateful...I know I would have been.

Answer 6: The gratitude of so many...to so few

Only weeks before the Battle of Britain, an army of some 300,000 British troops had been defeated in France...yet over the Summer of 1940...when everybody feared imminent invasion...only 3,000 young pilots were visibly "turning the tide of the war".

Numerically the pilots of the RAF were 1% of the number of men in the British Expeditionary Force that were driven out of France.

In my mind I can see how strongly Churchill's words would have resonated in the hearts of a grateful and relieved public when he said:

"Never in the field of human conflict, was so much owed, by so many, to so few"

Answer 7: Their Finest Hour

And what of Churchill's impassioned hope that:

"If the British Empire [were] to last a thousand years, men would still say, this was their finest hour."

The Battle of Britain is just about still within living memory, it was only 75 years ago

...and apparently half the population of the country that were saved from tyranny...have already forgotten The Few that saved them.


If our country did last a thousand years, and if the Battle of Britain did turn out to indeed have been its "finest hour" 
how ungrateful would it have been to have forgotten it entirely


Please, don't let the importance of the Battle of Britain die. It's not taught in schools, there are precious few films, plays or games of it and major book stores allocate very little shelf space to it.

Raise the profile of the Battle of Britain in any way you can and show your gratitude to The Few
...and everybody else who fought and lived through this extraordinary part of our history.

Thank you

by Steve Dunster

Friday, 24 July 2015

Who Had The Best Guns?


British .303" (7.7mm) Browning guns:

8 machine guns mounted in wings (outside the propeller disk)
20 rounds per second per gun (160 rounds per second overall)
11.3 gram bullets fired at 740 m/s (2,430 fps)
16 seconds worth of ammunition

Bf109s MG 17s (7.9mm) machine guns:

2 machine guns mounted in the engine cowling (synchronised to shoot through the propeller disk)
17 rounds per second per gun (slower because of sync with propeller)
Slightly more destructive than the .303s (bullet mass and muzzle velocity varied)
1 minutes worth of ammunition

Bf109E-4 20mm MG-FFM cannon:

2 mounted in wings
9 rounds per second per cannon (18 rounds per second overall)
92 gram explosive projectiles fired at 700 m/s
Less than 7 seconds worth of ammunition

Comparison

Spitfires and Hurricanes had 8x .303" Browning machine guns mounted in the wings where as the Bf109 had 2x machine guns mounted in the engine cowling shooting through the propeller disk.

The Bf109 machine guns could not fire as quickly as the Browning machine guns because they had to synchronise with the propeller.

The British fighters had to have their guns adjusted so they harmonised at a single point at a predetermined distance from the aircraft (360m at the start of the Battle and reduced to 225m due to battle experience). This meant they were only at their most destructive at this single distance. The Bf109 machine guns were effective over a much broader ranger because they were so close to the centre-line of the aircraft.

The Bf109 machine guns were slightly more destructive than the British Brownings but could carry nearly a minute's worth of ammunition rather than the 16 seconds carried by a Spitfire.

The Bf109E-4 cannon, with its explosive projectile, was much more destructive than the Brownings but had a much slower firing rate (9 rounds per second instead of the Brownings' 20 rounds per second) and only had 7 seconds worth of ammunition on board.

The Bf109E-4 cannon had a long flight time and curved trajectory (due to its low muzzle velocity) which made it difficult to hit targets at distance. It was quite a challenge for the German pilots because the flight times and trajectory curves of the cannon and machine guns were different requiring different mental calculations during combat.

How Did This Play Out In Combat?

It was much easier for a Spitfire or Hurricane to hit something with its eight fast firing Brownings than it was for a Bf109 with its slow, difficult to aim cannon with only 7 seconds of ammunition. 

but...

if a Bf109E-4 hit its target could cause an immense amount of damage.

Many a German aircraft would be riddled with .303 bullet holes but still return to base.

The RAF committed to fitting its Spitfires and Hurricanes with .303 machine guns well before WW2 when aircraft were slower and less well armoured. By the time of the Battle of Britain the RAF knew they needed much more powerful armaments. They tried to hurry in the fitting of 20mm Hispano cannons but they weren't reliable until after the Battle had ended.

So Which Guns Were Best?

Lesser pilots would find it easier to hit their target flying a British fighter than a Bf109

Better pilots would find it easier to bring down their target flying a Bf109

Whilst the guns would seem to have been better in the German aircraft, perhaps fortune favoured the British solution in a battle of attrition where, as time went on, experienced pilots were shot down and replaced with less experienced pilots.

by Steve Dunster



Thursday, 23 July 2015

The New Tactics that Devastated Convoy CW.8 on 25 July 1940


On 25 July 1940 the Luftwaffe took advantage of improved weather to attack a twenty-one ship convoy as it made its way through the Straits of Dover but they did so with devastatingly effective new tactics.

Of the 21 ships in the convoy only 10 reached their destination of Portland, 11 ships were sunk or seriously disabled during the attack. Two Royal Naval destroyers sent to help were also put out of action and had to be towed back to Dover.

This was the first time that Germany attacked a convoy from land, sea and air. They fired on the convoy with its big guns around Cap Gris Nez, they attacked it using high-speed German naval S-boats and bombed it from the air using wave after wave of Ju87 Stuka dive-bombers. The effect was devastating and the attack lasted from 11:30am to 7:30pm.

In the morning Convoy CW.8 (Convoy Westward) was attacked by a wave of Ju87s, 50 Bf109s, fast S-boats and was fired upon from the French shore.

The escorting Bf109s came in at sea level to be met by Spitfires of 65 Squadron (Hornchurch) while the Ju87s came out of the sky to dive bomb the convoy.

No 32 Squadron Hurricanes (Biggin Hill) and 615 Squadron Hurricanes (Kenley) came to assist the sea level dogfight with the fifty Bf109s.

No 54 Squadron Spitfires (Rochford) answered the call for assistance from the escorting naval vessels and engaged Bf109s that had arrived to assist the Ju87s. No 54 Squadron was to suffer badly but with one Spitfire to every five Bf109s it was a wonder that they only lost three aircraft.

Further waves of attacking aircraft continued through out the afternoon.

The Royal Naval destroyers Boreas and Brilliant were sent out from Dover to repulse the German motor torpedo boats attacking the convoy. Pursuing the S-boats away from the convoy and towards Calais, the destroyers were attacked themselves by German bombers.

Ju87s badly damaged Boreas with two hits on her bridge, 17 crew were killed and 5 died of their wounds.

Brilliant was also bombed, receiving two hits in the stern. Her tiller flat was flooded and boiler room fan support cracked but there were no casualties.

Both destroyers were towed back into Dover by tugs. Brilliant's repairs wouldn't be completed until September 1940 and Boreas wasn't repaired until January 1941.

25 July 1940 was undoubtedly a bad day for the RAF, the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy.

The losses were so great that it was decided to only move convoys through the English Channel after darkness and the Admiralty moved their RN ships out of Dover and put them in the relative safety of Portsmouth. Merchant ships would take on gunners in order to offer some defence and escorts would be provided in the future.

The day undoubtedly belonged to Germany and its effective new tactics but Britain was learning and adapting - a pattern that would repeat itself many times throughout the Summer.

by Steve Dunster






Wednesday, 22 July 2015

Big Wing or Political Conspiracy?


The term "Big Wing" refers to the aerial combat tactic of having several squadrons in a single formation and was contraversially adopted during the Battle of Britain by 12 Group commander Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory and Acting Squadron Leader Douglas Bader.

Initially the Duxford Wing (as it became known) had comprised 242, 310 and 19 Squadrons but later 302 and 611 Squadrons were also added.

It was thought larger formations (Big Wings) would facilitate the shooting down of higher numbers of enemy aircraft and incur fewer losses than using smaller formations. Sadly large formations were slow to deploy, difficult to manage in the air and chaotic in battle.

Leigh-Mallory and Bader of 12 Group felt there were huge advantages in having large formations to attack the enemy.

Dowding (commanding officer of Fighter Command) and Park (commander of 11 Group) strongly felt the opposite. Park had tried using Wings in the defence of the Dunkirk beaches and found them to be unwieldy, chaotic and often in the wrong place.

History has sided strongly with Dowding and Park

The Park approach of sending up single squadrons one after another to harass enemy formations on the way to their target was highly successful at protecting targets from the worst excesses of the raid and in the shooting down of enemy aircraft. Sadly it was costly and the tactic was not popular with some of his pilots because of the large losses.

This guerrilla approach to aerial combat was exactly right for the war Park had to fight but it made huge demands on the pilots' bravery and skill...nevertheless it protected targets and shot down enemy aircraft.

The Big Wing by comparison rarely engaged with the enemy (prior to the Luftwaffe raids on London) because it took too long to form up, was often in the wrong place, was unwieldy if it did engage and the increased chaos during combat resulted in much over-claiming of their successes. The Big Wing's actual successes turned out to be a fraction of what was claimed.

The supporters of the Big Wing would point out its high claims and low losses. Even at the time, the claims were thought to have been exaggerated and their low loss rate was accountable to the fact they had rarely engaged with the enemy.

So the Big Wing was an utter failure? Perhaps not...

History's assessment of the Big Wing's performance has been to assume its somewhat haphazard formation was solely intended to destroy enemy aircraft and protect intended targets...a purpose it was patently unsuited for according to the historic record.

But perhaps its purpose was not just to attack the Luftwaffe...it would seem that the Big Wing was an effective political device for use against Dowding.

Hugh Trenchard (founder of the RAF) had apparently clashed with Dowding when they were both commanders in the Royal Flying Corps during WW1.

Trenchard had retired by the time WW2 had started but was still influential at the highest levels of the RAF and Air Ministry.

Trenchard and his supporters felt that "the bomber would always get through" and that the only effective means of defending against bombing raids was to deliver a "knock out blow" by sending our own bombers back in response.

There was a strong feeling by some that Fighter Command was the wrong approach when it came to defence against bombers. Fortunately, Dowding managed to get enough political support to put together Fighter Command and its Dowding System of Command and Control...but Dowding was unpopular in powerful places.

When it became clear that Bomber Command was incapable of delivering a "knock out blow" to Germany in 1940 the pro-bomber advocates were severely embarrassed by Fighter Command's successes.

Was the Big Wing fiasco used by Dowding's political enemies to help bring him down?

The Duxford Big Wing was formed after only a telephone discussion between Leigh-Mallory and Bader with little planning and with no discussion or agreement with Fighter Command. Bader had great enthusiasm for a Big Wing and Leigh-Mallory took him at his word.

Is it dubious, or reckless, or negligent that a senior commander should take the word of an inexperienced junior officer and unilaterally commit to such a poorly executed experiment at such a critical time? And why did he put one of his least experienced Squadron Leaders in charge of such a difficult-to-lead unit?

Bader did not always follow ground control instructions and often flew into 11 Group's area on his own initiative leaving Fighter Command unable to use the Big Wing in any coordinated way and many times it was caught out of position and unable to do good.

Ironically Leigh-Mallory complained to Park during the Battle (according to McInstry), "Full explanation required why 11 Group fighters have shot down enemy fighters over 12 Group area."

At a meeting of the Air Council on 17 October 1940, Dowding and Park found themselves on the defensive. Park started to monitor the effectiveness of Leigh-Mallory's big wings and submitted a report which showed that in ten separate sorties in the second half of October they had managed to shoot down just one German aircraft. But nobody was interested. It would seem that political interests, not military evidence, was guiding those at the highest levels.

Despite having won the Battle of Britain, Dowding retired from his post in November 1940 and Keith Park was removed as commander of 11 Group and sent to Training Command. Park was replaced by Leigh-Mallory who brought his Big Wing ideas south. Leigh-Mallory would seem to have had sympathies in high places for his opinions and actions.

Dowding's career was over but Park would eventually be given commands as befitting his talents: Malta, Sicily and North Africa.

The Big Wing may not have played an important tactical role in Battle of Britain
...but it played a crucial role in the outcome of the political conspiracy against Dowding

When the Air Ministry's Historical Branch first published its account of the Battle of Britain, there was no mention of Hugh Dowding or Keith Park. It was only at Churchill's insistence that they were eventually included.

In a letter Park wrote at the time (McInstry), "Frankly I was more worried about the lack of cooperation (with Leigh-Mallory) than I was about out-witting the massed German raids."

Once Leigh-Mallory was in post at 11 Group in January 1941, a paper exercise was carried out to explore the effectiveness of a Big Wing within 11 Group. The intention was to prove the superiority of large formations using the circumstances of an actual attack on Kenley, Biggin Hill and Hornchurch sectors on 6 September 1940.

Leigh-Mallory mis-managed the operation, permitting the raid to progress unhindered which resulted in Kenley and Biggin Hill aerodromes being "bombed" whilst their aircraft were still on the ground.


We should perhaps be grateful that Leigh-Mallory wasn't successful in becoming 11 Group commander any sooner, the Battle of Britain may well have had a different outcome

by Steve Dunster