The Face of the Battle of Britain - Missing!

Over the Summer of 1940 one face in particular appeared on the pages of many picture magazines and newspapers. It depicted perfectly the face of a fighter pilot: young, keen and dashing - and it continues to be the iconic face of a Battle of Britain fighter pilot.

Sadly within weeks of this iconic photograph being taken, this young pilot was dead.

He was only 19 and was shot down only a few miles from the town he grew up in.

Despite his image being used extensively for articles, propaganda and recruitment, his identity was not released until long after the Battle. 

Perfect Portrait

It is easy to see how this image has stood the test of time and remained so iconic. It is difficult to imagine any photographer doing a better job.

 The camera height is low giving a heroic feel as the viewer looks up to him, it also puts what looks like clear blue Summer sky in the background.

He is looking up at that sky as if looking out for the enemy.

The shadows are high contrast and sharp-edged, which really makes it look like high Summer sun.

The camera is shadow-side, making the face almost 3D as the light rakes across it. 

And the way the sun glints on the equipment, you can almost feel the texture of the sun-warmed leather.

His face is beautifully framed by his equipment. Surely this is one of the finest portraits of a pilot from that era.

And then there's the pilot himself. He's young, dashing, cheerful and looking eager to get up into the Summer sky and do battle. But who was he?

Who Was He?

In July 1940 a photographic unit from Fox Photos visited RAF Hawkinge and took some iconic pictures of pilots from 32 Squadron. One of them, of P/O Keith Gillman was to become the face of the Battle of Britain and was soon to appear everywhere.

19 Years Old

Pilot Officer Keith Gillman was 19 years old and first flew with No 32 Squadron on 5 June 1940.

For much of July and August 1940, 32 Squadron was operating out of Hawkinge and took the real brunt of the Luftwaffe onslaught.

Gillman's First Victories

On 19 July 1940 twelve Hurricanes from 32 Squadron were involved in a big battle over Gillman's home town of Dover where he grew up. This from the Operations Record Book:

Dover area. At 19,000 feet a number of Ju87s observed bombing Dover. While evading AA fire, patrol was attacked by 12 Me109s and a dog-fight ensued. F/Sgt Turner was shot down in flames but baled out. Is now in hospital at Dover on danger list. Enemy aircraft were shot down by F/Lt Brothers (one Me 109), Sgt Henson (one Ju87), P/O Gillman (one Me109) S/Ldr Worral (one Me109 - unconfirmed).

In Gillman's own words on his Combat Report, this is how he "bagged" his first 109:

I was flying No 2 in Yellow Section, which was the Squadron rear guard. Three ME 109s dived in front of the section to attack Red Section, and I followed No 2 of the enemy formation who dived gently to port, and fired three bursts of approximately 50 rounds per gun, part of the aircraft was shot away, and it dived vertically towards the sea. It was obviously out of control but I had no time to follow it down, as I was attacked by another ME 109.

On 24 August 1940 he was involved in two big combats: at 20,000 feet over Dover when eleven of the squadron's Hurricanes were attacked by twelve Bf109s and shot down two for the loss of two of their own; and at 10,000 feet over Folkstone when ten Hurricanes took on fifteen Bf109s in the ensuing dogfight. No 32 Squadron's Operations Book recorded that Pilot Officer Gillman:

...attacked one which blew up and fell into the sea.

Pilot Officer Gillman Missing!

The following day (25 August) nine Hurricanes went forward from Biggin Hill to Hawkinge at 0825 hours. After one four-aircraft scramble from there they returned to Biggin Hill at 1420 hours; then at 1655 hours eight Hurricanes (led by Squadron Leader M N Crossley) took off again for Hawkinge. At 1820 hours they were scrambled from there and, in the words of the Operations Record Book:

...ordered to patrol Dover. Twelve Do215s escorted by about 26 Me109s were intercepted at 14,000 feet south of Dover. S/Ldr Crossley shot down a Do215 in flames and sent an Me109 spinning into the sea. F/Lt Proctor shot down an Me109 in flames off Cap Gris Nez. P/O Rose was shot down and baled out landing in the sea but was rescued uninjured after 1 1/2 hours. P/O Gillman missing.

It wasn't just his Image that was Iconic

Sadly it wasn't just young Keith's image that was iconic of the Battle of Britain...but also his fate. He'd only been with a front line squadron for a matter of weeks and had already shot down two enemy aircraft despite having less than glowing scores from his flight training only a few months earlier.

Within only a few weeks of joining his Squadron his was killed. He was nineteen...the same age as a youngster of today might leave college to go to university or finish an apprenticeship.

Sadly he was one of 449 fighter pilots who lost their lives defending the UK from widespread death and terror that would have resulted if Nazi Germany had succeeded in occupying mainland Britain.

Lest We Forget

by Steve Dunster

What If Germany had Invaded Britain

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The Battle of Britain was the huge air battle in the Summer in 1940 that was supposed to be the prelude to Germany's invasion of mainland Britain.

Pictures of Spitfires and dashing pilots and descriptions of the Battle of Britain as "the heroic struggle against Nazi tyranny" are so familiar that it is easy for them to lose their real meaning.

During the Battle of Britain pilots were for sure fighting for their country but do many of us actually  appreciate what would have happened to the UK population if Germany actually had invaded? 

We should remain grateful to the bravery and sacrifice of The Few...and here's why!

Nazi Germany had plans, detailed plans, as to what they would do with the UK had they invaded - and thank goodness it never happened.

Male Population Deportation

"The able-bodied male population between the ages of 17 and 45 will, unless the local situation calls for an exceptional ruling, be interned and dispatched to the Continent" according to captured documents. This represented about 25% of the male population. 

The deported male population would have most likely been used as industrial slave labour in areas of the Reich such as the factories and mines of the Ruhr and Upper Silesia. Living and working conditions would have been severe.

Terrorism, Hostages & Immediate Death Penalties

The remaining population was to be terrorised. Civilian hostages would be taken and the death penalty immediately imposed for even the most trivial acts of resistance.

Hitler had called the English lower classes "racially inferior". Presumably they may well have suffered similar treatment to that he had planned for the Russians, who the Nazis had regarded as sub-humans, fit only to be worked to death.

Plundering

The UK was to be plundered for anything of financial, military, industrial or cultural value.

"Aero-technological research...and important equipment" was to be secured as well as "Germanic works of art."

There was even a suggestion that Nelson's Column should be moved to Berlin.

Control over the Media

Major news agencies would be closed and control taken of all newspapers. Anti-German newspapers were to be closed down.

Death Squads

Death squads were to be tasked with liquidating Britain's Jewish population, some 300,000 in number.

The Black Book

They were also to immediately arrest 2,820 people identified in a list, known as the Black Book. The list included British subjects and European exiles living in Britain.

Against each name was the Security Office to which the person was to be handed over. Churchill was to be placed in the custody of Foreign Military Intelligence but most people listed were to be placed in the custody of the Gestapo.

The list included politicians and their families, poets, writers, journalists, publishers, pacifists, trade unionists, diplomats, film producers, directors, actors and actresses.

Himmler's Intention

Heinrich Himmler was one of the most powerful men in Nazi Germany and one of the people most directly responsible for the Holocaust. 

He is reported to have expressed his intention to kill about 80% of the populations of France and England by special forces of the SS after the German victory.

Chilling & Disturbing

It is chilling and disturbing to know what was planned for the UK population if Hitler's plan to invade Britain had been successful. 

Only the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy and the British Army stood in his way. 

Britain and her Empire stood alone. All her allies had already fallen and were starting to be subjected to similar plans to those intended for the UK.

"The Gratitude of Every Home in our Island..."

On 20 August 1940, whilst invasion of the UK was still in Hitler's plans, Churchill said that: 

"The gratitude of every home in our Island...goes out to the British airmen who, undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are turning the tide of the World War by their prowess and by their devotion." 

Knowing now what Hitler had planned if he'd been successful, Churchill was certainly right to fight on and had certainly not over-stated the levels of gratitude of the wartime generation

but every subsequent generation might do well to remember

how bravery, heroism and sacrifice of a Few 

saved an entire population, an entire way of life, an entire country...from oblivion.

Lest We Forget

by Steve Dunster

Some Squadrons had to be Replaced after a Week

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Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding was a big advocate of squadron rotation to give respite and time for training. The Luftwaffe on the other hand kept their units continuously in the front line.

Even as far back as July 1915 after the Battle of the Somme, Dowding was a strong supporter of pilot rotation.  When Dowding was commanding officer of No 16 Squadron, he clashed with General Trenchard, commander of the RFC, over the need to rest pilots exhausted by non-stop duty.


Here's how squadron rotation worked during the Battle of Britain, in Dowding's own words:

A fresh squadron coming into an active Sector would generally bring with them sixteen aircraft and about twenty trained pilots. They would normally fight until they were no longer capable of putting more than nine aircraft into the air, and then they had to be relieved.

This process occupied different periods according to the luck and skill of the unit. The normal period was a month to six weeks, but some units had to be replaced after a week or ten days.

By the beginning of September, the incidence of casualties became so serious that a fresh squadron would become depleted and exhausted before any of the resting and reforming squadrons was ready to take its place.

Fighter pilots still could not be turned out by the training units in numbers sufficient to fill the widening gaps in the fighting ranks. Transfers were made from the Fleet Air Arm and from the Bomber and Coastal Commands, but these pilots naturally required a short flying course on Hurricanes and Spitfires and some instruction in formation flying, fighter tactics and interception procedure.

by Steve Dunster

Hugh Dowding, architect of the Battle of Britain

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Hugh Dowding won us the Battle of Britain 

Was he rewarded? 

No! He was sacked!

The Battle of Britain was never part of Germany's war plan. If it had of been they would have built a strategic bomber force but their intent was to subdue the UK into taking no part in hostilities.

Hitler had assured Goering in 1938 that "War with England was quite out of the question". Even as late as August 1940 Hitler was hoping that the UK would sue for peace and forbad terror bombing of English cities.

The Battle of Britain was not even in the fore-minds of many of those at the Air Ministry or high up in the Royal Air Force. In 1932 British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin declared that "The bomber will always get through" and many people in positions of authority agreed with him.

There was a popular view that there was little point having a fighter defence system and that the only way to win an air war was to have sufficient bombers at your disposal so as to be able to deliver a "knock-out" blow to the enemy in response.

Dowding disagreed with Baldwin and all his supporters. He could foresee an air war that Baldwin thought would never happen but an air war that we now call the Battle of Britain.

Dowding was right. He confronted the political heavy-weights who advocated "the bomber will always get through" and won, but not without making political enemies.

The "Dowding System"

In July 1936 Dowding was appointed commanding officer of the newly created RAF Fighter Command. The integrated air defence system he put together had the following elements:

1. Radar (Dowding was one of the first to see its potential)
2. Royal Observer Corps (who filled in the gaps of radar coverage)
3. Raid Plotting
4. Radio control of aircraft

He ensured that the network was linked by dedicated telephone cables buried sufficiently deeply to provide protection against bombing. The network had its centre at a converted country house on the outskirts of London, RAF Bentley Priory.

The system as a whole later became known as Ground Control Interception (GCI) but is still referred to as the "Dowding System."

Introduction of New Aircraft

Dowding introduced modern aircraft into the service including the Spitfire and Hurricane. He was not a supporter of the Defiant, instead he felt that the best fighters were those that were forward firing and aimed by the pilot.

He is credited with having taken on the Air Ministry and won to ensure that fighter aircraft were equipped with bullet proof wind shields.

Battle of Britain

Dowding resisted repeated requests from Prime Minister Winston Churchill to weaken the home defence by sending precious squadrons to France before it fell.

Yet again, Dowding had determined a carefully thought through path and faced-down political heavy-weights, but with political cost.

During the Battle itself the Dowding System worked as a force-multiplier, getting much greater benefit from the small forces at his disposal.

Dowding's major contribution during the Battle was to marshal resources behind the scenes including replacement aircraft and air crew. He left his subordinate commanders more or less a free hand to run the battle in detail.

Dowding's Downfall after Victory

Dowding had foreseen the Battle of Britain, prepared for it, fought it and won it. At each of these stages he had carefully considered his options, chosen what turned out to be correct choices but in the process he made resentful political enemies.

"The bomber will always get through" supporters thought money should be spent on building a stronger bomber force not wasted on his Fighter Command approach.

During the Battle of Britain it became clear to all that Bomber Command was nowhere near strong enough to be capable of delivering the "knock-out blow" required to deter Germany from bombing England. As Dowding's Fighter Command approach was seen to be succeeding, resentment against him grew.

Dowding's strategy of preserving his fighter reserve by using guerrilla tactics against large bomber formations as directed by his ground controllers proved highly successful. At the height of the Battle his approach was challenged strongly by 12 Group commander Leigh-Mallory and Acting Squadron Leader Douglas Bader. They strongly advocated the unwieldy and ineffective Big Wing approach of forming up three or more squadrons before engaging the enemy. As Keith Park pointed out, Big Wings were too slow to form up and usually in the wrong place.

History gives us the hindsight of knowing that Dowding's choices were correct but political momentum seemed again to have been with his adversaries.

As the RAF began to win the air war over England it was inevitable that the daylight skies would be cleared and German bombers would restrict their operations to night bombing. Dowding knew this would happen and also knew that the only answer to this lay in the development of Airborne Interception Radar. His efforts to bring AI radar into service had been frustrated by those around him but when the night Blitz of London started and AI radar wasn't ready, political pressure was applied to him.

A committee of enquiry chaired by Sir John Salmond produced a long list of recommendations to improve night air defence. Dowding approved only a selection of Salmond's recommendations. Churchill and Lord Beaverbrook decided it was time for Dowding to step down.

Personally I don't know what the recommendations were but it seems entirely in Dowding's character to have carefully considered all the options and only backed those he thought of value...and he may have been right...but those panicked by the politics caused by the dreadful bombings would have wanted to have seen every possible action taken.

Dowding was unwillingly replaced in command in November 1940 by Big Wing advocate Sholto Douglas.

If you want to know more about how Dowding and his 11 Group commander Keith Park suffered politically after their victory of the Battle of Britain, you may like to read our blog about it: 
Big Wing or Political Conspiracy

The Gratitude of Every Home in Our Island?

It seems sad that it was Churchill's words about the gratitude of the whole nation going out to those who'd eventually win us that Battle of Britain, and that it was Churchill who sided with Dowding's political adversaries in his sacking.

The lack of gratitude felt by Dowding when he was sacked by Churchill after he won the Battle of Britain must have been remarkably similar to that that Churchill wrote about after losing the 1945 General Election having won the War.

In the Words of His Pilots

Squadron Leader George Darley

Dowding was too nice a chap and he came up against a gang of thugs. Leigh-Mallory was very jealous of him. He felt he wasn't getting enough of the limelight and he got a lot of backing in the Air Ministry.

Flight Lieutenant Francis Wilkinson

It was entirely [Dowding's] foresight in being able to see where the strain was going to come, and to be able to take the measure of that strain, which allowed Fighter Command to bear the enormous, almost unbearable load that it had when the fighting came. Stuffy (the pilot's nickname for Dowding) had foreseen that our fighter squadrons were going to be depleted in strength. He had foreseen that Sector Operations Room would be bombed. And he'd made plans for the rapid interchange of squadrons between Scotland and Northern England and the South. If it hadn't been for his colossal foresight and meticulous planning right from the very beginning, we'd have had it.

Squadron Leader Sandy Johnstone

After Stuffy was made to retire the war blew up into a global thing. Great names arose - Eisenhower, Montgomery, Alexander, Bradley. Great battles were won - Alamein, D-Day, the crossing of the Rhine. But they were all courtesy of Stuffy Dowding. None of these people would even have been heard of if Stuffy hadn't been there, if he hadn't won the Battle of Britain. His statue ought to be standing atop a plinth in Trafalgar Square.


My Personal Opinion

Dowding was known for his humility and great sincerity and was widely considered by his pilots as a leader who cared for his men and had their best interests at heart.

He often referred to his "dear fighter boys" as his "chicks", in fact his son Derek was one of them.

Dowding seems to have been a thoughtful and clever man. A man who felt that the burden of command was to determine the best answer and fight for its implementation whatever the political cost.

All politics can do is get you sacked...but being wrong can get people killed!

Luckily for us he achieved great things, 
things that we could easily look back on and say that "This was our Finest Hour"

...sadly he suffered terribly at "man's ingratitude".

The inscription at the foot of Dowding's statue outside St Clement Danes church on the Strand in London, is one of the finest tributes to him I have read and I share it with you:

Air Chief Marshal Lord Dowding was commander-in-chief of Fighter Command, Royal Air Force, from its formation in 1936 until November 1940. 

He was thus responsible for the preparation for and the conduct of the Battle of Britain. With remarkable foresight, he ensured the equipment of his command with monoplane fighters, the Hurricane and the Spitfire. 

He was among the first to appreciate the vital importance of R.D.F. (radar) and an effective command and control system for his squadrons. 

They were ready when war came. 

In the preliminary stages of that war, he thoroughly trained his minimal forces and conserved them against strong political pressure to disperse and misuse them. 

His wise and prudent judgement and leadership helped to ensure victory against overwhelming odds and thus prevented the loss of the Battle of Britain and probably the whole war. 

To him, the people of Britain and of the Free World owe largely the way of life and the liberties they enjoy today

If you want to know more about how Dowding and his 11 Group commander Keith Park suffered politically after their victory of the Battle of Britain, you may like to read our blog about it:
Big Wing or Political Conspiracy

by Steve Dunster

The Attack Dive of a Ju87 Stuka

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The Junkers Ju87 Stuka dive-bomber was one of the most iconic German aircraft of the early part of the war. With its inverted gull-shaped wings, fixed undercarriage and distinctive spats over its wheels, visually there was nothing else like it.

At first sight the Ju87 looks to be ungainly, unlikely and dated. Actually it was a thorough-bred and the work that Junkers put into its development was extraordinary. It was designed as a precision dive-bomber for close-air support for the German army and in this role it reigned supreme.

The Ju87 was not only incredibly accurate but also truly terrifying. The troops being bombed by it knew they were the target because it was screaming and pointing at them. To augment the Ju87's well-known whistling, the crews attacked sirens, "Trumpets of Jericho", to the landing gear as an added psychological weapon (though this wasn't used much during the Battle of Britain). For troops defending a strong point, a Ju87 attack was truly a terrifying experience.

The German air ministry had declared that all German bombers must be capable of dive bombing. This was because dive bombing was so much more accurate than level bombing and Germany was critically short of munitions.

In the Ju87, Junkers developed a dive-bomber that was un-matched by anything else in the world. With its strengthened airframe and attack dive autopilot system, it could maintain control whilst accurately diving at 90 degrees onto its target at a constant speed of over 300mph.

Here's an insight into the procedures the pilot went through during his attack dive:


The pilot approaches his target at between 13,000 and 15,000 feet and locates his target through a bombsight window in the cockpit floor.

He sets the chosen altitude for bomb release and pullout into the autopilot system (usually at a minimum height of 1,500 feet) .

He moves the dive lever to the rear, limiting the "throw" of the control column.

He opens the dive brakes,  sets the trim tabs, retards his throttle and closes the coolant flaps.

The aircraft rolls 180 degrees onto its back and then noses into a dive.

Red tabs protrude from the upper surfaces of the wing as a visual indicator to the pilot that, in case of a g-induced black-out, the automatic dive recovery system would be activated.

The Stuka dived at an angle between 60-90 degrees, holding a constant speed due to dive brake deployment which increases the accuracy of the Ju87's aim.

The pilot would manually fine-tune the dive angle (often 90 degrees) by reference to the visual horizon out the side of his canopy.

At about four seconds before the release altitude is reached, a horn in the cockpit would sounds. When the horn stops, a light on the contact altimeter comes on, the pilot releases the bomb and initiates the automatic pull-out mechanism by depressing a knob on the control column.

An elongated U-shaped crutch located under the fuselage swings the bomb out of the way of the propeller and the aircraft automatically begins its 6g pullout causing the crew's sight to grey out. Once the nose was above the horizon, the dive brakes retract, the throttle opens and the propeller is set to climb.

The pilot regains control and resumes normal flight.

He must reopen his coolant flaps quickly to prevent his engine from overheating.

With the target area now behind the aircraft, the rear gunner would spray the area with machine gun fire, keeping the defenders' heads down to help ensure the success of the next Stuka dive bomber in line.

The automatic pull-out was not liked by all pilots. Helmut Mahlke said that on his unit they disconnected the system because it allowed the enemy to predict the Ju87's recovery pattern and height, making it easier for ground defences to hit an aircraft.

Ungainly? Yes! 

Vulnerable to attacks but fast Spitfires and Hurricanes? Yes!

...but as an accurate and terrifying bombing system it was unmatched. 

In the Ju87 Stuka dive bomber, the German army must surely have had the most effective artillery in the world.

Perfect for the prosecution of a lightning war, or Blitzkrieg!

by Steve Dunster

Spitfire Shot Down After Solo Attack on Twelve Bf109s

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On 11 August 1940, Pilot Officer Stevenson from 74 Squadron (Spitfires) climbed to attack a Bf109. He thought the enemy must have thought he was another 109 but then he suddenly dive away. Stevenson followed and gave him a two second burst. He saw the 109 lurch slightly and then go into a vertical dive. Stevenson kept his height at 15,000 feet and watched as his victim dived straight into the sea fifteen miles south-east of Dover.

Stevenson then climbed to 23,000 feet up-sun and saw a formation of twelve Bf109s which was 2,000 feet below him north of Dover. He started to dive down onto them from the out of the sun with the intention of spraying the whole formation from behind. Before he could engage them, there was a large amount of cannon and machine gun fire coming from behind him. A dozen Bf109s were diving at him from out of the sun and about half of them were shooting at him.

He heard a popping noise and his control column became useless and his aircraft entered a vertical dive. He pulled his canopy hood back in order to bale out. He got his head out of the cockpit and the slipstream tore the rest of him out of his aircraft.

He watched his Spitfire crash into the sea a mile off Deal. It took him twenty minutes to come down on his parachute and as he did so he had drifted eleven miles out to sea. After an hour and a half, an MTB boat came to look for him but in the heavy sea it couldn't find him. Stevenson fired shots from his revolver and kicked up foam in the water. The MTB saw him, picked him up and took him to Dover.

Pilot Officer Stevenson was awarded the DFC (gazetted 27 August 1940) and he was posted on 20 September 1940 to 5 OTU Aston Down as in instructor.

He was killed on 13 February 1943 as a Flight Lieutenant with 64 Squadron shot down during a sweep over the Boulogne area in a Spitfire IX.

by Steve Dunster

"A War Against England is Quite Out of the Question", Hitler 1938

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During the Summer of 1940, Germany came perilously close to winning the Battle of Britain by destroying RAF Fighter Command over Southern England and allowing Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of England, to begin.

During the Spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe had been highly successful in the tactical close-air-support role of Germany's Blitzkrieg (lightning war) across Europe but it was it's strategic bombing role in the Blitz (bombing of British cities) from September 1940 onwards, that lost Germany the air war over England.

Germany's pre-war thinking was very much that the Luftwaffe's primary role was as tactical close air support for the army. This proved most successful in Poland, Belgium and France.

Ironically, if the Luftwaffe had remained in the tactical role of destroying Fighter Command airfields, it may well have won the Battle of Britain - it was only when it turned to strategic attacks on cities (for which the Luftwaffe had not designed) that the Battle started to turn in Britain's favour.

Tactical Good - Strategic Bad!

Between the wars, the German military were working on the assumption that the prospects of peace in Europe after 1940 were doubtful. The Luftwaffe was therefore instructed to prepare for war with a target date of 1943.

Germany's first consideration was for land wars with its European neighbours which led it to the conclusion that the Luftwaffe's primary role was to support the army.

Dive Bombers Good - Level Bombers Bad

Severe shortages in munitions led it to  an almost obsessive preference of dive-bombing over level bombing. Dive bombing was very much more accurate, which would considered or critical importance due to the desperate shortage of munitions available to Germany.

The demand for bombs would be so great during the Polish campaign that for a while concrete bombs filled with shrapnel were produced to cover shortages.

Medium Bombers Good - Heavy Bombers Bad

The severe shortages in petroleum products meant it could not run a heavy bomber force for strategic bombing. The proportion of resources that a heavy bomber capability would take from the Luftwaffe's petroleum products budget was considered to be much too big for the small benefit they thought they might get from it.

Another reason a heavy bomber force was never developed was the lack of suitable engines to power a heavy bomber. This was partly due to the late start that German engineers had in designing high-performance engine types and partly due to the low octane fuels available to operate them.

Germany entered the war using 87-89 octane fuels. In contrast, during the Battle of Britain, the British were using 100 octane rules supplied by the United States.

German industry had designed some successful heavy bombers but the Luftwaffe would never get to use them.

Development of German Bomber Types

Between the wars, Germany was rapidly building an air force and designing the aircraft that it should comprise of. From concept to production of a new aircraft type, it could take the best part of five years. This allowed for only two or three generations of aircraft before their target date of being ready for war by 1943. Between 1919 and 1929 the speed, range and bomb load of a typical bomber had more than doubled.

In 1934 a medium bomber specification was issues and the Dornier Do17 and the Heinkel He111 were selected for further development but these would continue to have shortcomings which led to the development of the Junkers Ju88 "fast bomber".

The original Ju88 had very impressive performance which was the spoilt by the German authority's insistence on it being modified to have a dive-bombing capability.

"A War Against England is Quite Out of the Question"

Hitler told Georing in the Summer of 1938 that:

"a war against England is quite out of the question!" 

[The Luftwaffe War Diaries, Bekker 1968] 

It is this, together with shortages of munitions and petroleum products that sealed the fete of Germany's expensive heavy bombers. Emphasis would instead be put into larger numbers of the fast, light, twin-engined medium bombers which were accurate and ideal for close air support of land forces.

Hitler hadn't expected a war with England and the Luftwaffe hadn't prepared for it. But had Germany produced a heavy bomber capability in time for use against England's cities as well as its airfields, the levels of destruction, and even the very outcome of the Battle of Britain itself, could well have been different.

by Steve Dunster

The True Start Date of the Battle of Britain? ...and Convoy Peewit

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The 8 August 1940 saw the first large scale sustained clashes between the RAF and the Luftwaffe and as such was initially considered to be the official start date of the Battle of Britain by the Air Ministry.

In 1941 Dowding rejected the 8 August to be the start date and proposed it to be the 10 July 1940, which, in Britain, is the date accepted by most nowadays. In Germany, the start of the Battle of Britain was when they launched their Eagle Attack, their plan for the destruction of RAF Fighter Command.

The action in the period from 10 July to 7 August was in many ways indistinguishable from post-Dunkirk harassing raids. For this reason, some still consider the 8 August to be the true start date of the Battle of Britain.

On the days leading up to the 8 August 1940, Luftwaffe activity was fairly light. This was mainly due to the fact that there was little in the way of British shipping movements.

The 8 August 1940 saw are a large convoy (with the RAF codename of Peewit) of more than twenty merchant ships attempting to go through the Straits of Dover and heading westwards.

The 8 August 1940 saw the heaviest ever raids against a British convoy. 

Only 4 of original 20+ ships of Peewit convoy reached Swanage undamaged

This was the first time for two weeks that a merchant convoy attempted passage through the English Channel.

The convoy had assembled the previous night at Southend and passed through the Dover Straits during the hours of darkness, heading for Swanage in Dorset.

Sadly the convoy was picked up by the German Freya radar. German torpedo boats were sent to attack at the convoy at dawn and afterwards some 300 Ju87s and 150 Bf109s were also sent to attack the convoy.

41 Squadron (Spitfires), 64 Squadron from Kenley (Spitfires), 65 Squadron from Hornchurch (Spitfires) and 610 Squadron from Biggin Hill (Spitfires) were sent to the Channel to intercept.

The torpedo boats had sunk three ships and damaged another three before light.

The British fighters reached the enemy aircraft before they had engaged the convoy. During the air combat that followed, four Spitfires were shot down with three pilots killed, one bailed out. Two more Spitfires were damaged and forced to return to base and another crash-landed on the Kent coast.

A Bf109 was shot down and the pilot killed, four others tried to make it back to base but crash-landed in Northern France. Another was severely damaged but made it back to base.

Only one ship received damage from a single Ju87 that managed to get through.

With the benefit of low cloud, the protection of the Royal Navy and RAF fighters, Convoy Peewit continued its journey westwards.

Further down the coast the convoy ran into better weather and the convoy was attacked by 89 Ju87s and 70 Bf109s just off the Isle of Wight. The Ju87s caused severe damage to the convoy.

Fighter Command scrambled 145 Squadron from Westhampnett/Tangmere (Hurricanes), 257 Squadron from Northolt (Hurricanes) and 609 Squadron from Middle Wallop (Hurricanes) to meet the attackers.

By the time the RAF arrived the Ju87s were returning to their bases but intense combat ensued between the British fighters and the Bf109s.

The Spitfires and Hurricanes were forced to fight the Bf109s, leaving Ju87s to attack the convoy unhindered.

Damaged and burning ships bellowing black smoke were scattered over the Channel for miles.

The RAF had lost 13 Hurricanes in defending Peewit, five others were damaged and one Spitfire was destroyed. 13 pilots were killed and 3 seriously wounded.

Len Deighton in his book Fighter (1977) commented:

The British sailors who died this day were the victims of two aspects of stupidity. Firstly, the coastal convoys, carrying domestic cargoes, were still being sent through the dangerous waters of the Channel (instead of the goods going by railway, as they did later). Secondly, the Admiralty, in spite of endless evidence, refused to allow for the fact that the Germans might have excellent radar.

Whatever the shortcomings of the Admiralty, this was indeed a portent of the intense air fighting to come when massive formations of Luftwaffe and RAF aircraft would clash in the skies over the next few weeks.

To some, it was the intense aerial combat over Convoy Peewit which heralded the start of the Battle of Britain proper,  on 8 August 1940

by Steve Dunster

The Destruction of Fighter Command - in 4 Days?

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Hitler's Directive for the Conduct of War Against England

On 1 August 1940 Hitler issued his Directive No 17, For the Conduct of Air and Naval Warfare Against England. In summary it said:

• Employ all forces available to eliminate the British air force as soon as possible
• Once temporary or local air superiority is achieved, operations will continue against ports
• Air operations against hostile naval and merchant ships will be considered a secondary mission
• The intensified air offensive will be conducted so that adequately strong air forces can be made available whenever required to support naval operations against favourable fleeting targets

Eagle Attack

On 2 August 1940 the Luftwaffe General Staff issued the plan for the destruction of the RAF, starting the campaign for the Battle of Britain. Their plan for Adlerangrif or "Eagle Attack" consisted of three phases:

Phase One

First 5 days: attacks made a semicircle starting in the west and proceeding south and then east, within a 90 to 60 mile radius of London

Phase Two

Next 3 days: radius from London reduced to between 60 and 30 miles

Phase Three

Final 5 days: attacks concentrated within a 30 mile radius centred on London


In addition to the task of defeating the RAF, the German Combined Staffs had issued a directive in July from Field Marshal Keitel stipulating:

"The German lack of command of the sea could be substituted by supremacy in the air"

It was recognised that permanent air supremacy was impossible without the occupation by land forces because many of the British air bases and supporting factories were beyond the range that Luftwaffe bombers could operate with fighter escorts. But it was thought that temporary air supremacy over the invasion area would be possible. This was considered sufficient to allow Operation Sea Lion (the invasion of England) to proceed as planned.

The Luftwaffe were confident in their believe that they could achieve:

"The destruction of RAF Fighter Command in the south, would take four days"

Not all of the Luftwaffe leadership was the General Staff that Alderangrif was the correct approach. The two Luftlotten commanders, Sperrle and Kesselring, both felt that RAF Fighter Command should be decisively weakened through night attacks before beginning any significant daylight operations.

These views were over-ruled by Goering who believed that Fighter Command had already been substantially weakened. Goering was slowly beginning to take more and more control of Luftwaffe operations.

PHASE ONE of Eagle Attack

On 6 August 1940 Goering set 10 August as the start date for Eagle Attack but bad weather postponed it until 13 August. On the 13th marginal weather resulted in the cancellation of some missions and sporadic  results from others. Instead of focussing on Fighter Command, target types were many and varied, including: Bomber Command airfields, Fighter Command airfields, Coastal Command stations, channel shipping, aircraft factories and at least nine manufacturing cities.

There was little other objective other than to "test the British defences."

Throughout Phase One, through to the 18 August, attacks were directed against Fighter Command but generally only limited damage was inflicted with most facilities back in service within hours.

Despite having the objective to reduce the effectiveness of Fighter Command, only limited effort was directed against Fighter Command bases, facilities and command and control capabilities.

Goering's Reorganisation after Phase One

The Luftwaffe believed it was sufficient to draw up the British fighters to kill them in the air and a German intelligence report on the 18 August suggested that it was working:

"Estimated that the British had lost 770 fighters in the period from 1st July to 16th August and that only 300 were still operational"

In reality 214 British fighters had been destroyed, 71 damaged in combat and more than 600 were still operational.

At the end of Phase One, Goering decided to withdraw Ju87s from the Battle because of their excessive losses and he needed to conserve them for support of invasion forces. Bf110s had suffered similarly high losses but Goering refused to withdraw them, instead he directed Bf109s to escort them as well as bombers.

Despite the Bf109s accounting for the majority of RAF kills, Goering would persistently blame the Bf109 pilots for lack of aggression and this led to some senior fighter unit commanders being replaced.

Goering also decided there was little value to making any further attacks of British radar installations.

PHASE TWO of Eagle Attack

Phase Two did not immediately follow the first phase because of reorganisation or additional fighter forces in the Pas de Calais and because of bad weather. After a five day delay the offensive resumed on 24 August. The Luftwaffe concentrated its attacks on Manston, Hornchurch and North Weald.

New tactics were used by both sides. The Luftwaffe used fewer bombers and more fighters in their formations because of the continued reluctance of the British to do battle with the German fighters. Park had ordered his pilots to accept combat with German fighters only if Fighter Command sector airfields were threatened.

For the duration of Phase Two, 24 August to 6 September, the RAF lost 273 fighters in combat plus 49 damaged. The Luftwaffe lost 308 fighters and bombers with 62 damaged.

Six out of seven sector airfields were extensively damaged and the telecommunications links to and from the operations blocks had proved especially vulnerable.

The German strategy of concentrating on attacking Fighter Command airfields was working, it was forcing the RAF fighters into combat. The higher concentration of fighters in German raids reduced the edge that Fighter Command had previously had.

The Luftwaffe could afford to trade Bf109s one for one with Spitfires and Hurricanes.

Fighter Command was Facing Destruction by the end of Phase Two

According to Dowding, "The rate of loss was so heavy that fresh squadrons became worn out before convalescing squadrons were ready to take their place."

Dwindling Reserves

Between 8 August and 6 September, 657 British fighters had been lost. By using replacement aircraft from repairs and storage, Fighter Command had managed to keep frontline strength to about the same levels as were available at the end of July - until 1 September.

Reserves had dwindled from 518 Spitfires and Hurricanes on 6 July to only 292 by 7 September.

Disappointing Production

In the last week of August, only 91 Spitfires and Hurricanes were produced while losses reached 137 destroyed and 11 seriously damaged.

On the Verge of Destruction

Fighter Command estimated that reserves would be exhausted in three weeks followed by the steady depletion of frontline squadrons. This would be accelerated if the Luftwaffe could successfully know out critical production facilities.

Critical Shortage of Pilots

In Phase One of the campaign (8 to 18 August) the RAF lost 154 pilots (killed, seriously wounded or missing) but only 63 new fighter pilots had come through from the training schools.

During August the combat strength of Fighter Command fell by almost a third from 1,434 to 1,023. The squadron average fell from 26 to 16 operational pilots.

In July and August, roughly a quarter of the squadron leaders and a third of the flight leaders had been killed or removed from flying due to injuries.

Experienced pilots made up less than half of Fighter Command's strength, the remainder having less than 20 hours flying time on fighters.

Stress levels were high and it was not uncommon for pilots to fly three or four sorties a day.

Eagle Attack Nearly Worked

The RAF was faced with the real possibility of withdrawing the depleted and exhausted 11 Group to bases north of London.

Goering's Eagle Attack was close to success. The Luftwaffe had within its grasp the possibility of achieving air superiority over the landing grounds of Operation Sea Lion, the German invasion of England.

Luftwaffe's Change in Strategy

From the Luftwaffe's point of view, losses were very heavy and they had failed to tempt the RAF up in sufficient numbers to allow the German fighters to deliver the decisive blow.

The idea of attacking London was gaining traction by the end of August.

The German High Command had set 15 September as the original date for the invasion but by the beginning of September it was delayed until 21 September because the Luftwaffe had not neutralised the threat from the British Navy and RAF to the invasion forces.

On 3 September Goering told Kesselring and Sperrle that there was no chance of destroying the English fighters on the ground and the RAF's last reserves would have to be forced into the air.

His idea was that if the British were heavily defending their airfields, then they would defend even more vigorously their capital. Since London was within the range of the Bf109, the Luftwaffe could more easily concentrate their fighter forces for the kill.

Sperrle strongly disagreed with Goering's plan to attack London. He felt that the British forces were too strong and that they too could concentrate all the their fighters over London. He favoured continued attacks on the airfields.

German intelligence reports suggested that British aircraft serviceability was as low as 100 at the end of August. In fact the operational strength stood at 672 on 23 August.

Hitler had forbidden attacks on London but the British had launched several attacks on Berlin in response to an accidental bombing of parts of London on 24 August. Fearing for his own popularity, Hitler agreed on 31 August to reprisal attacks on London.

PHASE THREE of Eagle Attack

On 7 September, Phase Three started with 650 bombers and over 1,000 attacking London docks by day. Substantial damage was inflicted on London but Fighter Command, from 7 September onwards, had been saved from defeat on the ground. However, it was still possible that the RAF could be defeated in the air above London.

From 11 to 14 September, London was attack by two major attacks (200+ bombers) and two minor attacks by day as well as attacks every night. Additional day raids were also carried out on Southampton (twice), Portland, Brighton, Eastbourne, Canterbury, Great Yarmouth and Norwich presumably to soften up the defences of these cities in preparation for invasion. But instead, the Luftwaffe would almost certainly have been better targeting 11 Group airfields.

Luftwaffe bombers losses were high and the bomber commanders were successful in getting Goering to order that the first role of the German fighters was to protect the bombers and not attack the enemy, but his stated objective was to draw up fighters so they could be destroyed. The whole purpose of attacking London in the first place would seem to have been lost.

The respite experienced by RAF airfields allowed the first break in over ten days for the pilots of 11 Group. Fighter Command had been in a state of near exhaustion but a new vigour resulted and was to prove decisive in the air battles on 15 September, they day that is now celebrated as Battle of Britain Day.

The Decisive Day - 15 September 1940

The Luftwaffe High Command fully expected the missions scheduled for 15 September to be the decisive blow. From Hitler down, the German leadership believed that Fighter Command had been broken in spirit and material. RAF resistance to attacks on 11 and 14 September had been slight (owing to errors in coordinating intercepts).

Attacks against London on 15 September involved 300 bombers and 1,000 fighters with another raid  of 30 against Portland and Southampton aircraft works.

With the support of 12 Group, Fighter Command met the raid with 170 Spitfires and Hurricanes operating from bases close to London which were not under attack.

Fighter Command downed 58 and damaged 25 German aircraft including 26 fighters lost and 8 damaged. Psychologically, the blow to the Luftwaffe was devastating.

British superiority on the 15 September was most likely to have benefited from the proximity of their airfields to the Battle, the freshness of the crews, the fact the airfields had not been attacked for the two days previous and the fact there was no diversionary raid.

German attacks continue in attempts to wear down the enemy but none with the strength launched on the 15 September.

Despite their continuing attacks, the Luftwaffe saw no evidence that the RAF was getting weaker but was suffering terrible losses.

Eventually raids would be restricted to the hours of darkness and Operation Sea Lion was indefinitely postponed. In the Spring of 1941, Hitler turned his attentions towards Russia and the Luftwaffe units that had been bombing England were re-deployed to the Eastern Front.

Britain can be grateful to more than just Churchill's Few

Fighter Command, particularly Dowding and Park but also all the pilots and ground crew, had played their part well and were well deserved recipients of the "gratitude of every home in our Island."

But Britain should also be grateful to some of those "in the abodes of the guilty" (as Churchill described the Germans):

had they attacked airfields by night prior to attacking them by day, 

had they attacked the airfields for longer, 

had they continued to attack Britain's radar installations, 

had Goering allowed his fighters to engage the British fighters instead of protecting his bombers, 

had Goering continued to attack airfields whilst he attacked London

had Hitler followed his instinct and prevented attacks on London 

and focussed on air-supremacy over his landing grounds

then the Luftwaffe may have won the Battle of Britain and Hitler may have invaded England.

by Steve Dunster

British Radar: It's not what you've got - it's what you do with it!

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British radar has widely been credited as being a major reason for the RAF being able prevent the Luftwaffe from gaining air superiority over the UK during the Battle of Britain.

British radar could determine the distance and height of aircraft approaching the coast from 200 miles away and could even detect low flying aircraft from a distance of 100 miles away.

This allowed RAF Controllers to have sufficient early warning to be able to scramble fighters and direct (vector) them to intercept raids without having to fly standing patrols, giving exhausted pilots much needed respite at the height of the battle.

It is thought that the effectiveness of British radar largely neutralised the advantage that Germany should of had from its superiority in numbers making the Battle much more closely matched. Without radar the RAF would probably have been overwhelmed by the Luftwaffe and the Battle of Britain may well have been lost. 

Why didn't the Luftwaffe knock out the British radar stations? 

It wasn't because radar was a military secret or because Germany couldn't work out what the strange masts were for. They knew exactly what they were and what they were capable of.

Germany actually had much better radar than Britain during the Battle of Britain. Their radar sets were smaller; easier to rotate, move and position; higher resolution and able to detect smaller targets.

Whilst their Freya radar sets were better, they were of a more complex design and they only had 8 operational by the start of the war, leaving large gaps between covered areas.

British radar was simpler and easier to make and by the start of the war there was a complete chain of radar stations looking out to sea all along the southern and eastern coasts (Chain Home or CH).

Germany was successfully detecting RAF bomber raids in great detail with their radar but they were having big problems communicating any useful information in time to their intercepting fighters. They therefore assumed that the RAF would have the same problem so didn't see British radar as a high priority target.

Curiously, whilst Germany was having problems getting radar data to fighters, they did seem to have some success in vectoring bombers onto shipping targets they'd detecting some 60 miles away.

At the start of the Battle of Britain, Germany did try to attack British radar using two different methods: dive-bombing and jamming.

Dive-bombing met with little success, primarily because the huge masts of open steel construction were quite resilient to bomb damage. A few of the radar stations were taken off line temporarily but only for few hours. It is perhaps worth considering what might have happened if Germany had realised their importance and been more persistent in their raids.

Jamming only met with temporary success. In July 1940 a simple method of jamming was used by Germany but was easily defeated. In September 1940 a more elaborate method of jamming was used but this too was quickly defeated.

The Dowding System

What was exceptional about the British radar, was not the radar itself but the command and control method developed before the war by Dowding and his commanders.

British radar could only look out to sea, once the raid was over land, the radar was no help and plotting raids over land had to be done with the help of the Observer Corps.

The UK was divided up into small areas, each with it's own designation and there would be an Observer Corps detachment responsible for each. Each detachment would be connected by telephone to the same filter rooms as the radar stations allowing a battle plan be updated,almost in real time so the commanders could decide how to respond.

The UK had solved the problem of getting useful radar data to the intercepting fighters!

It also had radar stations that were resilient to bombing, a design that was simple and quick to construct, a radar coverage that was complete with no holes, a backup system with the Observer Corps and a radar design that was capable of being quickly modified to counter jamming.

Britain didn't have the best radar - but it did know what to do with it!

by Steve Dunster